Ehley of Wauwatosa" are asking “to postpone the state's primary and scrap in-person voting less than 12 hours before polls opened”.

4. April 9, 2020 “the city of Green Bay’s Mayor, Eric Genrich intentionally caused chaos ahead of the April 7 election. Rather than to administer the election as safely and efficiently as possible, Genrich caused confusion and made it more difficult for people from his city to vote. His efforts through the election into chaos caused massive lines in the city of Green Bay to vote”.

5. Sep. 24, 2020 "Green Bay receives half-a-million in grant money for improving election safety". “The Center for Tech and Civic Life non-profit is helping out cities across the county. About $1.5 million in total is set aside for Green Bay, to buy equipment for polling locations and pay poll workers more. However, a series of federal lawsuits filed today in battleground states say the money is intended to be used government employees to influence the count on the presidential election, by intentionally targeting Democratic strongholds to boost voter turnout in those areas only.”

Following the spring primary, the mayor’s office continued to control the elections at the frustration of the municipal clerk as indicated in synopsis of emails provided:

1. Kris Teske, March 16, 2020 “I’m not comfortable with the number of people coming into the Clerk’s Office. I am going to setup a station for people to fill out their absentee request. Can I have everyone request a permanent absentee ballot, so they don’t have to give photo ID?” To Genrich, Ellenbecker.


3. Kris Teske, June 19, 2020 “Yes, I have time on Monday.” Ellenbecker response “Let’s take each new issue/decision one at a time. I will try to be more supportive o your role as Clerk and decisions that you need to make. Let’s move forward and not look behind.”

4. Ellenbecker, July 8, 2020 “Sounds like there has been discussion about Hazard Pay, especially since we have now received the $1,093,400 grant.” To Kris and Celestine

5. Kris Teske, July 9, 2020 “I haven’t been in any discussions or emails as to what they are going to do with the money. I only know what has been on the news/in the media. I received an email this morning from the Mayor concerning using the old Circuit city building for early voting. I don’t know anything about this or how it will be staffed. Are we going to use city staff that are certified in the system? The Clerk’s Office doesn’t have the staff to work at different locations when the Clerk’s Office is open. Again, I feel I am being left out of the discussions and not listened to at the meetings. Also, it talked about electronic poll books and the faster tabulator. I was told by WEC we can’t get electronic poll books this year and I don’t think doing something like this on the biggest election would be good anyway. If we could get the faster tabulator that would be great, but I don’t know if there are any left. I am worried about getting absentee ballots done on Election Day.” To Ellenbecker.

6. Kris Teske, July 9, 2020 “I just attended the Ad Hoc meeting on Elections. I keep getting the run around on when I can purchase the DS450 if there are any available.” “Did you see the Mayor's response to me concerning Satellite polling locations? You stated that I should let him, and Celestine know about the June 11th deadline. I feel he is mad but it’s the law. Celestine said the attorneys will fight it out. If the decision is to go forward with additional sites, I would like it in writing for the file. I don’t want anyone to think I didn’t follow the law. In April, the WEC was fine with what we did because of the urgency. I don’t know if you read my email asking who is going to staff these additional sites. I asked in the meeting if it was City staff and was told it could be. These people have to be certified in the WEC system to be able to run it. We don’t have extra staff in the Clerk’s office for this. I also stated that we can’t just put two new people in a building and think they will be able to run it without questions.” “I also asked when these people from the grant give us advisors who is going to be determining if their advice is legal or not. Every state has different laws. And this group is from Illinois. They already should have pointed out that additional in-person early voting sites can’t happen because of the deadline has passed. I asked who are they going to be working with-Celestine? She said yes and the others but Kris you are the leader. None of this has been discussed with me. Celestine also stated the Ad Hoc Committee will be helping to make the decisions for the grant money. I thought this meeting was to assist the Clerk’s Office. I don’t know what our role is anymore. If you get a chance, please watch the meeting, and let me know your thoughts. I don’t know what the answer is, and I don’t think it pays to talk to the Mayor because he
From: Celestine Jeffreys  
Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2020 11:04 PM  
To: Joanne Bungert  
Subject: FW: Center for Tech & Civic Life Next Steps/Green Bay

JB,

Can you take a look and make sure this is kosher?!!

Money!!

Celestine Jeffreys  
Chief of Staff, Mayor’s Office  
City of Green Bay

From: Tiana Epps-Johnson [mailto:tiana@techandciviclife.org]  
Sent: Monday, July 13, 2020 6:31 PM  
To: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>  
Cc: Selkowe, Vicky <Vicky.Selkowe@cityofracine.org>  
Subject: Re: Center for Tech & Civic Life Next Steps/Green Bay

Hi Celestine,

So good to meet you. I’m really looking forward to working with you in the coming months! As Vicky shared, I’m reaching out to accomplish a few things:

- Share the WI Safe Voting Plan grant agreement for your review (attached)
- Collect point of contact information
- Schedule a kick-off meeting to take place next week

Grant Agreement  
A draft grant agreement is attached for your review.

Actions needed:
1. Please review the agreement. Are there any requested revisions?
2. Are there any additional approvals required before you’re able to accept the grant funds? If so, what are those steps? And what is the anticipated approval timeline?

Point of Contact Information  
We want to be sure we direct our communications to the folks on your end best suited to respond.

Actions needed:
1. Please share the following:
   a. Primary point of contact (Name, Email, Phone)
   b. Clerk’s office contact (Name, Email, Phone)
   c. Mayor’s office contact (Name, Email, Phone)
   d. Finance contact (Name, Email, Phone)

Kick-off Meeting  
We would like to schedule a one-hour kickoff meeting to take place next week. We’d like to use the meeting to:
- Meet each other’s teams
- Share an overview of the technical assistance we have available to support implementation of your plans
Recommendation IV: Ensure Safe & Efficient Election Day Administration

It is no small task to mitigate risk of a lethal pandemic at all polling locations and throughout all required Election Day processing. Municipal clerks must ensure they have done everything possible to comply with public health guidelines and mitigate the risk of COVID-19 for all of the election officials, poll workers, observers, and voters. Our five municipalities are in need of numerous resources to both ensure seamless processing of voters on the upcoming Election Days, procure Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), disinfectant, and cleaning supplies to protect election officials and voters from the coronavirus, and to aid in processing of an expected high volume of absentee ballots. Additionally, as several of our municipalities move to add or expand drive-thru voting on Election Days, those expansions come with additional unbudgeted expenses for signage, tents, traffic control, publicity, and safety measures. All of our municipalities need resources to ensure that the remaining 2020 Election Days are administered seamlessly and safely.

- **Green Bay:** Green Bay would like to purchase 135 electronic poll books ($2,100/each for a total of $283,500) to reduce voter lines, facilitate Election Day Registrations and verification of photo ID. The City would also like a high speed tabulator ($62,000) to count absentee ballots on Election Day, a ballot opener and ballot folder ($5,000), and additional staff to process absentee ballots on Election Day ($5,000). The City also needs masks, gloves, gowns, hair nets, face shields ($15,000), cough/sneeze guards ($43,000), and disinfectant supplies ($3,000). **Total: $426,500**

- **Kenosha:** The City would like to purchase automatic hand sanitizer dispensers for all polling locations ($14,500) as well as PPE (gloves, masks, disinfectant, etc.) for all poll workers and voters ($15,200). Kenosha would also like to be able to offer elderly residents and people with disabilities who wish to vote in person on Election Day two-way transportation, utilizing a local organization such as Care-A-Van ($2,000). The City also needs resources for technology improvements to include a ballot opener, a ballot folder, 12 additional laptops and dymo printers, and high-speed scanner tabulators ($172,000 total) to expedite election day processing and administration. **Total: $203,700**

- **Madison:** The City needs hand sanitizer for all poll workers and voters, disinfectant spray, plexi-glass shields to allow poll workers to split the poll books, face shields for curbside election officials, and face masks for all poll workers and observers ($20,000) as well as renting additional space to safely and accurately prepare all supplies and practice social distancing at the public test of election equipment ($20,000). If the new voter registration form is not translated by the state into both Spanish and Hmong, Madison plans to translate the form ($500). **Total: $40,500**
Recommendation III: Launch Poll Worker Recruitment, Training, and Safety Efforts

The pandemic made conducting Election Day activities extremely challenging. Most poll workers in Wisconsin are retirees doing their civic duty to help facilitate the election. Given the increased risk for the elderly if exposed to COVID-19, many experienced poll workers opted out. Milwaukee had so many poll workers decline to serve that the City went from 180 polling locations to five polling locations. Green Bay, facing a similar exodus of poll workers, went down to two polling locations. Racine usually relies on nearly 190 poll workers for a spring election; only 25 of those experienced poll workers were under the age of 60.

As fears about the coronavirus increased in mid-late March and early April, poll workers in all five municipalities declined to work the election, leaving cities scrambling to quickly recruit enough bodies to keep polling locations open. All cities were appreciative of the last minute assignment of hundreds of Wisconsin National Guard members to assist with Election Day activities, and all of our cities re-assigned City staff from other departments to serve as poll workers and election officials and to assist with the myriad of tasks related to Election Day administration. The remainder of positions were staffed by high school students, college students, and members of the National Guard. Many of our poll workers had never worked an election before.

- **Green Bay:** The City needs to hire a total of 380 workers per election (total $112,660). The City would like to pay poll workers more than they have previously received, to signify their importance in the process and to acknowledge the extra challenge it represents to serve as an election official during a pandemic. The City would like to increase poll worker salaries by 50% (additional $56,330). All poll workers will be trained through the Wisconsin Elections Commission website and the City's own training manual ($6,000). **Total: $174,990**

- **Kenosha:** The City needs to hire 350 poll workers per election ($100,000). They would like to offer hazard pay to increase pay to $160/worker and $220/chief inspectors ($10,840). To aid in recruitment efforts, the City would like to hire a recruiter and liaison position for poll workers ($35,000). **Total: $145,840.**

- **Madison:** The City utilizes the election toolkit available through the MIT Technology Project to determine the staffing levels needed to ensure that voters will not have to wait in line for more than 15 minutes. In addition to the one Chief Inspector per polling location, Madison also has additional election officials who are certified as the Absentee Lead at each polling location. Madison estimates that if 75% of votes cast are absentee, the City will need 1,559 election officials at the polls in August. The City envisions a robust and strategic poll worker recruitment effort, focusing on people of color, high school students, and college students. The City would like to have resources for hazard pay for poll workers this fall at a rate comparable to what the U.S. Census is paying in the area
considerable staff time to construct that list of residents and directly mail a professionally-designed piece (in multiple languages) to those voters. ($50,000 total for staffing, design, printing, and postage). To assist new voters, the City would also like resources to help residents obtain required documents (i.e. birth certificates) which are needed to get a valid state ID needed for voting. These grant funds ($15,000) would be distributed in partnership with key community organizations including churches, educational institutions, and organizations serving African immigrants, LatinX residents, and African Americans.  
**Total: $215,000**

- **Kenosha:** Would like to directly communicate to all Kenosha residents via professionally-designed targeted mail postcards that include information about the voter’s polling location, how to register to vote, how to request an absentee ballot, and how to obtain additional information. The City would have these designed by a graphic designer, printed, and mailed ($34,000). The City would also like resources for social media advertising, including on online media like Hulu, Spotify, and Pandora ($10,000) and for targeted radio and print advertising ($6,000) and large graphic posters ($3,000) to display in low-income neighborhoods, on City buses, and at bus stations, and at libraries ($5,000).  
  **Total: $58,000**

- **Madison:** Would like to engage the City’s media team to produce videos to introduce voters to the election process, voting options, and to explain the safety precautions taken at polls and early voting sites. These videos would then be shared in numerous ways, including through partner organizations and on the City’s social media platforms. The City would also like to partner with community organizations and run ads on local Spanish-language radio, in the Spanish-language newspapers, on local hip hop radio stations, in African American-focused printed publications, and in online publications run by and for our communities of color (advertising total $100,000). Additionally, the City has many poll workers who are from historically disenfranchised communities. The City would like to pay those poll workers ($75,000) to conduct voter outreach and additional poll worker recruitment activities.  
  **Total: $175,000.**

- **Milwaukee:** Would like to partner with other City divisions to develop mailings and door hangers ($10,000) that could accompany water bills, be distributed by the Department of Neighborhood Services, or hung on trash receptacles by sanitation staff. The City would also like to revamp current absentee voting instructions to be more visual, address issues specific to the pandemic such as securing a witness signature, prepare it in English and Spanish, and print 150,000 color copies (estimated total $15,000). The Election Commission would also like to produce a short video ($5,000) with visuals showing voters how to apply for an absentee ballot and how to correctly complete and return the ballot. Additionally, the Election Commission would like to hire a communications firm to prepare and implement a comprehensive voter outreach communications plan.
locations and 1 drive-thru location, potentially at a central location like Miller Park, for four weeks prior to the November election ($450,000). (Establishing this many EIPAV sites requires a significant investment in IT equipment, an additional ballot printer, tents, signage, and traffic control assistance. Milwaukee would also like to offer evening and weekend early voting hours which would add additional costs for both August ($30,000) and November ($75,000). Total: $705,000.

- Racine: The City would like to offer a total of 3 EIPAV satellite locations for one week prior to the August election, as well as offering in-person early voting - curbside, if City Hall is still closed to the public - at the Clerk’s office for 2 weeks prior to the August election. For the November election, Racine would like to offer EIPAV at 4 satellite locations two weeks prior to the election and at the Clerk’s office (again, potentially curbside) 6 weeks prior. The City would need to obtain PPE, tents, supplies and cover staff time and training ($40,000). Racine would also like to have all satellite locations available for half-day voting the two Saturdays ($17,000) and Sundays ($17,000) prior to the November election, and the library and mall locations would be open until 8pm the week prior to the Election. Additional resources needed include one-time set-up fee per location ($7,500), laptops and dymo printers ($10,000), training ($1,100), and signage ($12,000.) As well, the City would like to host at least one drive-thru Voter Registration Day, where City Hall would be set up for residents to come get registered, curbside, and get their voting questions answered by Clerk’s staff. Newly registered voters could also get assistance requesting absentee ballots for upcoming elections while they’re there. ($8,000) Total: $112,600

Total: $1,092,639.00

Recommendation I Total for All Strategies to Encourage and Increase Absentee Voting by Mail and Early, In-Person: $2,572,839.00
additional overtime costs ($100,000) for staff processing of absentee ballots and other election-related tasks. **Total: $210,000**

- **Milwaukee:** Given its tremendous volume of absentee ballot requests and processing tasks which far exceeds that of the other municipalities, Milwaukee would like to completely automate and expedite the assembly and mailing of requested absentee ballots. The City would like to purchase a high-speed, duplex printer, a top-of-the-line folding machine, and a high quality folding and inserting machine. This would reduce staff costs and eliminate the use of absentee labels, by enabling the City to print directly onto inner and outer envelopes. This would also allow the City to have a small 2D barcode that the inserter machine would be able to scan to ensure that the outer envelope is for the same voter; increasing quality controls. This automation would enable the City to eliminate the assembly delay no matter the volume of daily absentee requests, allowing experienced election workers and previously trained election temporary employees to be re-deployed to early voting sites as supervisors and lead workers. **Total: $145,000**

- **Racine:** To process absentee ballot requests in April, the City estimates that it will need seven additional full-time employees to process all election requests. These employees will be needed full-time for one month prior to the August Election (approximately $17,000) and seven weeks prior to the November election (approximately $30,000). **Total: $47,000**

  **Total: $658,000**

4. **Expand In-Person Early Voting (Including Curbside Voting)**

For a variety of reasons, many voters in our municipalities do not want to vote by mail and prefer to vote in-person. As a result of the coronavirus, far more voters are interested in early, in-person absentee voting (EIPAV) than we’ve seen in previous elections, wishing to avoid lines or crowds on Election Day. All five municipalities would like to have resources to accommodate these early, in-person voters. Expanding access to early, in-person voting also will lessen lines at polling places on Election Day and allow for proper social distancing and other pandemic precautions to be uniformly implemented.

Curbside and drive-thru voting have been very popular with residents of our municipalities, particularly for those with health concerns who can remain in the cars and have a virtually contact-less voting process. For example, Milwaukee previously operated in-person early voting for one week leading up to the April election at three sites and then transitioned to one site of drive-thru voting. 11,612 cast ballots through these options: 5,571 via in-person and 6,041 at drive-thru, and these numbers represent a 46% increase over April 2016 “early voting” totals. However, it is slow-moving and
supplies ($4,000) and set up at the City’s community centers to assist voters with all aspects of absentee ballot request, including photo ID compliance. Due to the increase of absentee mailed requests the City of Racine will need an additional 2 full time staff members in the Clerk’s Office in order to have a reasonable turnaround time for absentee requests ($100,000). Total: $116,000.

**Total: $635,700**

2. **Utilize Secure Drop-Boxes to Facilitate Return of Absentee Ballots**

Our five communities all share a desire to expand voters’ ability to easily return absentee ballots to the municipality without having to rely on the postal service, since, after April’s election, many voters are (rightfully) apprehensive that putting their completed ballot in the mail does not guarantee it will be received and counted by the municipality by statutory deadlines. Voters also need to have confidence that they are returning their completed absentee ballots into secure containers that are not at risk of tampering. All five cities need resources to purchase additional secure drop-boxes and place them at key locations throughout their cities, including libraries, community centers, and other well-known places, to ensure that returning completed ballots is as secure and accessible to voters throughout our cities as possible.

- **Green Bay:** The City would like to add secure (security cameras $15,000) ballot drop-boxes (approximately $900 each) at a minimum of the transit center and two fire stations, but if funding were available would also install secure drop boxes at Green Bay’s libraries, police community buildings, and potentially several other sites including major grocery stores, gas stations, University of Wisconsin Green Bay, and Northern Wisconsin Technical College, in addition to the one already in use at City Hall. **Total: $50,000**

- **Kenosha:** The City currently has two drop-boxes that are checked throughout the day, and would like to install 4 additional internal security boxes at Kenosha libraries and the Kenosha Water Utility so that each side of town has easy access to ballot drop-boxes. **Total: $40,000**

- **Madison:** The City would like to have one secure drop box for every 15,000 voters, or 12 drop boxes total ($36,000). The City would also like to provide a potential absentee ballot witness at each drop box, utilizing social distancing and equipped with PPE (staff costs unknown): **Total: $50,000**

- **Milwaukee:** The City would like to install secure 24-hour drop boxes at all 13 Milwaukee Public library branches, staffed with socially distanced volunteers to serve as witnesses. **Total: $58,500**
Increasing the number of voters who cast votes prior to Election Day minimizes the risk of spreading COVID-19 on Election Day from in-person contacts at our polling locations, and it reduces the chance for lines and delays in voting on Election Day.

The Wisconsin Election Commission (WEC) has approved a proposal to mail all registered voters absentee ballot request forms, which allows our five communities to focus on helping voters overcome the barriers to successfully returning those forms so they can obtain, and then successfully submit, their completed absentee ballots. This measure will provide absentee request information directly to voters, alleviating the need for municipalities to expend the cost to send the mailing. However, it is unclear how this measure will affect the workload of municipal clerks. Although the WEC has directed that the forms be returned to the WEC for entry, municipal clerks must still review each record, process, mail, record receipt and canvass each absentee ballot.

All of our municipalities anticipate continued large increases in absentee voting based on the April 2020 trends. Milwaukee, for example, anticipates that 80% of residents will vote absentee by mail for both the August primary and the November general election.

All five cities have identified numerous barriers to successful absentee voting, including: voters facing numerous challenges to successfully submitting valid photo ID; voters needing assistance complying with absentee ballot certification requirements, including obtaining the required witness signature on the absentee ballot return envelope; the labor-intensive process faced by all of our clerks’ offices of processing absentee ballot requests; and U.S. Postal Service errors and mail delays. All of these are challenges for our municipalities in normal elections, but they are all compounded by the coronavirus pandemic, and made exponentially more difficult by the unprecedented volume of absentee voting requests. This puts tremendous strain on municipal election clerks and their staff.

Our five cities share the desire to assist as many residents as possible with casting ballots before Election Day, serving as the greatest opportunity we have to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in our communities. We have identified several strategies to help voters in each of our communities overcome these barriers to successful absentee voting, both by mail and in-person early voting.

Overall, our five communities are requesting $2,572,839 in resources related to enabling our municipalities to overcome these particular barriers and ensure that our voters can meaningfully access absentee voting, both by mail and in-person early voting. These strategies and resource needs are broken down into four distinct component recommendations, within the overall umbrella of increasing and encouraging absentee voting:
Recommendation 1: Encourage & Increase Absentee Voting By Mail and Early, In-Person

Of all the things that need to be done to ensure access and safety at the polls, this is perhaps the most important and timely. It is time, resource, and labor intensive but results in the voter being able to vote by mail or from the relative safety of their car or at a socially distanced and carefully planned early voting site.

Overview of Absentee Voting in Wisconsin

Before discussing our strategies and plans to encourage and increase absentee voting, both by mail and in-person, early voting, it’s important to first understand the absentee voting context in Wisconsin.

There are two ways to vote early in Wisconsin: in-person and through the mail. Both are technically called “absentee voting,” a phrase held over from a time when absentee voting required you to affirm that you were over 80, ill, or going to be out of the municipality on Election Day. Those requirements no longer exist in the statutes, and people can vote early, or absentee, for any reason. The April 2020 election saw dramatic increases in the number of absentee ballot requests over previous elections.

While for many regular voters, absentee voting - whether completed by mail or early, in-person - is a relatively easy process, our five cities understand that absentee voting does not work easily for all voters. Our communities of color, senior voters, low-income voters without reliable access to the internet, people with disabilities, and students all have legitimate concerns about the absentee voting process.

Voting absentee by mail has been complicated by the fairly recent imposition of state law requiring voters to provide an image of their valid photo ID prior to first requesting an absentee ballot. While this works relatively easily for voters who have valid photo IDs and the technology necessary to upload an image file of that valid ID into the state’s myvote.wi.gov website, it does not work well or easily for other voters who do not have valid photo ID (complicated by closure of DMVs due to the pandemic), lack access to reliable internet (also complicated by coronavirus-related closures or reduced hours at libraries and community centers, leaving those residents without regular public internet access that our municipalities normally provide), those who don’t have smart phones to take and upload photos, and those who need additional education about what constitutes a valid photo ID. (For example, countless voters in our municipalities attempted to submit “selfies” as valid photo ID. Explaining to them that this was not a valid form of photo ID and instructing them on how to properly submit valid ID took considerable staff time and resources.)

Once the absentee ballot is received, it must be completed correctly to be successfully cast, and there are numerous certification requirements on the absentee ballot envelope; if not correctly completed, the ballot could be rejected. Prior to this April's
Comprehensive Election Administration Needs for 2020

In early June 2020, all five municipal clerks and their staff, with review and support from all five cities' Mayors and Mayoral staff, completed a detailed, multi-page template (attached) providing both data and information about the municipalities' election plans and needs. This Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan 2020 is based on that comprehensive information. All five of our municipalities recommend the following four strategies to ensure safe, fair, inclusive, secure, and professional elections in our communities for the remaining 2020 elections:

**Recommendation I: Encourage and Increase Absentee Voting (By Mail and Early, In-Person)**

1. Provide assistance to help voters comply with absentee ballot requests & certification requirements
2. Utilize secure drop-boxes to facilitate return of absentee ballots
3. Deploy additional staff and/or technology improvements to expedite & improve accuracy of absentee ballot processing
4. Expand In-Person Early Voting (Including Curbside Voting)

**Recommendation II: Dramatically Expand Strategic Voter Education & Outreach Efforts, Particularly to Historically Disenfranchised Residents**

**Recommendation III: Launch Poll Worker Recruitment, Training & Safety Efforts**

**Recommendation IV: Ensure Safe & Efficient Election Day Administration**

As detailed in this plan, our municipalities are requesting a total of $6,324,567 to robustly, swiftly, comprehensively, and creatively implement these four strategic recommendations in each of our communities. That request is summarized as follows in Table 3, below, and detailed extensively in the remainder of this plan.
Table 1: Summary of Municipalities’ Electorate Data, June 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Green Bay</th>
<th>Kenosha</th>
<th>Madison</th>
<th>Milwaukee</th>
<th>Racine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated Eligible Voters</strong></td>
<td>71,661</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>213,725</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>56,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Registered Voters</strong></td>
<td>52,064</td>
<td>47,433</td>
<td>178,346</td>
<td>294,459</td>
<td>34,734</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2020 Election Budget</strong></td>
<td>$329,820</td>
<td>$205,690</td>
<td>$2,080,283</td>
<td>$2,986,810</td>
<td>$409,529</td>
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All five jurisdictions share concerns about how to best facilitate voter participation and limit exposure to coronavirus. All five jurisdictions spent all or most of the budgeted resources for all of 2020 on the extraordinary circumstances this Spring. If no plan is approved, it will leave communities like ours with no choice but to make tough decisions between health and the right to vote; between budget constraints and access to fundamental rights. The time that remains between now and the November Election provides an opportunity to plan for the highest possible voter turnouts in the safest possible ways.

We are collectively requesting a total of $6,324,527 as summarized in Table 3 below and detailed extensively in the plan.

**Review of the April 2020 Election**

The April 2020 election placed two sacred duties of cities in conflict: keeping our residents safe and administering free and fair elections. Since Wisconsin's elections are administered at the municipal level, each municipality was on its own to deal with these dynamics. Our Municipal Clerks and their staff are all remarkable public servants, who responded nimbly and effectively to marshal the resources needed to run these elections under exceedingly challenging circumstances. In this election, all five of our municipalities faced:

- Precipitous drop-offs of experienced poll workers;
- A scramble to procure enough PPE to keep polling locations clean and disinfectected and to mitigate COVID-19 risk for election officials, poll workers, and voters;
- A never-before-seen increase in absentee ballot requests;
- High numbers of voters who struggled to properly submit required photo ID and/or provided insufficient certification of absentee ballot envelopes; and
- Voters who, understandably, were completely confused about the timeline and rules for voting in the midst of a pandemic and required considerable public outreach and individual hand-holding to ensure their right to vote.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>People Needed</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prep ballot bins</td>
<td>Kim and staff</td>
<td>1 DS450, 2 DS200s, 4 envelope opening machines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Move machines to KI</td>
<td>DPW or Maintenance</td>
<td>PPE, badges/stickers, printer, portable dropbox, list of assignmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Move supplies to KI</td>
<td>Amaad and Michael</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>KI Setup</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>6am</td>
<td>Move ballot bins to KI</td>
<td>DPW</td>
<td>Michael at KI to guide</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shift 1</td>
<td>6am-3pm</td>
<td>Ballot sorting</td>
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<td>1 Ideally should be WisVote-trained</td>
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<td>Envelope Opening Machine Oper:</td>
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<td>4 Also floater within pod for breaks</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Ballot preparation teams</td>
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<td>48 24 teams</td>
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<td>Ballot scanners (DS-450)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ballot scanners (DS-200)</td>
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<td>2 1 for each machine</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
I think were probably okay; I don’t think anyone challenged the ballots when they came in.

On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 9:27 PM Vanessa Chavez <Vanessa.Chavez@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:
Thanks for the heads up.

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 3, 2020, at 8:27 PM, Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein <michael@voteathome.org> wrote:

In case you didn’t hear, someone or several people harassed CSOs and prevented one of the dropbox deliveries from getting to City Hall by 8 PM.

We have the delivery logs to establish that they picked the ballots well before 8. Milwaukee is prepared to rely on the same interpretation we’re using about the City Hall dropboxes to say that any ballots in the hands of the clerk’s agents before 8 PM count.

Want you to be prepared and feel free to give me a call: [redacted].

--
Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein
State Lead for Wisconsin (Leadership Now Fellow)
National Vote at Home Institute
Hi Kim,
I'm putting together instructions for the Central Count workers, augmenting your guide with the DS450 instructions. There were just a couple points that I wanted to confirm.

Do you have a few minutes this afternoon to go through the process? I'll make myself available any time you are.

Thanks,
Michael

---

Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein
State Lead for Wisconsin (Leadership Now Fellow)
National Vote at Home Institute
he/him

Learn more about:
Election Officials Center
Mail Ballot FAQs
Mail Ballot Security
Deanna Debruler

From: Celestine Jeffreys
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 7:54 PM
To: Whitney May
Subject: RE: UPDATE: Absentee instructions template & envelopes from Center for Civic Design: No action required

No, I must have missed that email.

I’ll take a look. I think the envelopes will be a great improvement, but for next year.

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff
Office of the Mayor
920.448.3006

From: Whitney May <whitney@techandciviclife.org>
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 7:50 PM
To: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: Re: UPDATE: Absentee instructions template & envelopes from Center for Civic Design: No action required

Hey Celestine,

I’m excited for y’all to get the envelopes next year. It’ll be great.

Regarding the instructions sheet, did you get the Uniform Absentee Instructions sheet from WEC today?

It’s attached. I’m assuming they want all cities using the same envelopes AND absentee instructions, too.

Let me know what you think.

Whitney M

On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 7:43 PM Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:

Thanks, Whitney!!

I had mocked-up some changes to the insert. Here they are; what do you think? I didn’t hear from Kris, she’s not feeling well today.
Stay safe out there,

Whitney M

On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 6:36 PM Witzel-Behl, Maribeth <MWitzel-Behl@cityofmadison.com> wrote:

Wow! Thank you!

I like the design. Is it possible to have the text larger in the instructions? I'm wondering how hard it might be for our older voters to read the 9-point font.

Thank you!

- Maribeth

From: Whitney May <whitney@techandciviclife.org>
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 12.07 PM
To: Michelle Nelson <mnelson@kenosha.org>; Coolidge, Tara <tara.coolidge@cityofracine.org>; Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>; Witzel-Behl, Maribeth <MWitzel-Behl@cityofmadison.com>; cwooda@milwaukee.gov; Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov
Cc: Josh Goldman <josh@techandciviclife.org>; Asher Kolieboi <asher@civicdesign.org>; Christopher Patten <christopher@civicdesign.org>
Subject: Absentee instructions template & envelopes from Center for Civic Design: Feedback requested by Friday

Caution: This email was sent from an external source. Avoid unknown links and attachments.

Hello Claire, Celestine, Kris, Tara, Michelle, and Maribeth:

You are the famous WI-5. Congrats on successful administration of last week’s state primary! Excited to see November be an even bigger success for you and your teams.
Whitney May
Director of Government Services
Center for Tech and Civic Life
whitney@techandciviclife.org
(919) 799-6173
she/her
I understand. I think it’s all fixed now.

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff, Mayor’s Office
City of Green Bay

I’m sorry, I am so busy. I should have crossed off masks required.

Kris Teske, WCMC
Green Bay City Clerk
100 N. Jefferson St., Rm 106
Green Bay, WI 54301
920-448-3014

Thank you Kris! Here’s a revised copy with changes incorporated.

Sam Hutchison
sam@hvsproductions.com
HVS Advertising-Marketing | A Division of Image Keepers, Inc.
2021 S. Webster Ave. Green Bay, WI 54301-2257
920.430.5131 ext. 224
Thanks Celestine,

No, Kris wasn’t copied in. I can incorporate all of your revisions and send an updated version to you and Kris for review.

Sam

Sam Hutchison
sam@hvsproductions.com
HVS Advertising-Marketing | A Division of Image Keepers, Inc.
2021 S. Webster Ave. Green Bay, WI 54301-2257
920.430.5131 ext. 224

From: Celestine Jeffreys <mailto:Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2020 2:48 PM
To: Isabel Brinker <IBrinker@kw2madison.com>; Sam Hutchison <sam@hvsproductions.com>
Subject: 2020-10-14 CGB Vote Countdown

Here are my changes. Did Kris submit hers as well?

CMJ
From: Celestine Jeffreys [mailto:Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 1:41 PM
To: Kevin Warych <Kevin.Warych@greenbaywi.gov>; Kim Wayte <Kim.Wayte@greenbaywi.gov>; Diana Ellenbecker <Diana.Ellenbecker@greenbaywi.gov>
Cc: Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein <michael@voteathome.org>; Saralynn Finn <saralynn@voteathome.org>; Sam Hutchison <sam@hysproductions.com>; Shelby Edlebeck <Shelby.Edlebeck@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: RE: 2020-10-25 Voter Navigator FAQ--cmj

That’s a good thought!

Kim, Diana, Sam, Saralynn, Shelby and Michael, what do you think about posting this on our website?


Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff, Mayor’s Office
City of Green Bay

From: Kevin Warych <Kevin.Warych@greenbaywi.gov>
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 1:26 PM
To: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: RE: 2020-10-25 Voter Navigator FAQ--cmj

Can we get this on the city website...this is good info.
Deanna Debruler

From: Celestine Jeffreys
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 3:02 PM
To: 'Whitney May'
Subject: RE: getting in touch

Thanks!! We had a very nice conversation and I'm ready to roll!

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff
Office of the Mayor
920.448.3006

From: Whitney May [mailto:whitney@techandciviclife.org]
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 2:45 PM
To: Eric Ming
Cc: Celestine Jeffreys
Subject: Re: getting in touch

Thanks, Eric! I don't need to be on this call, so I'll let Celestine drive scheduling.

On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 8:53 AM Eric Ming <eric@modernelections.org> wrote:
How does 3:30 CT/ 4:30 ET today or 1:00 PM CT/2:00 PM ET sound? We can use my conference line: 920-297-4742::no pin

On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 6:51 PM Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:

Eric,

It's a pleasure to meet you by email!

Whitney connected us and we're eager to get started on a media campaign that would include the items Whitney listed:

- Radio ads on local Spanish-language radio stations, as well as geofencing.
- They have a slogan, "Mailed it" and a mood board.
- This is an urgent need.


166
Whitney May  
Director of Government Services  
Center for Tech and Civic Life  
whitney@techandciviclife.org  
(919) 799-6173  
she/her
From: Kris Teske
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 3:08 PM
To: Diana Ellenbecker <Diana.Ellenbecker@greenbaywi.gov>; Kim Wayte <Kim.Wayte@greenbaywi.gov>; Vanessa Chavez <Vanessa.Chavez@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: FW: Dayna in Green Bay

Hi,

[Redacted]

Thank you,

Kris Teske, WCMC
Green Bay City Clerk
100 N. Jefferson St., Rm 106
Green Bay, WI 54301
920-448-3014

From: Whitney May [mailto:whitney@techandciviclife.org]
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 8:05 AM
To: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>; Kris Teske <Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov>
Cc: Ryan Chew <ryan@electionsgroup.com>
Subject: Dayna in Green Bay

Hi Celestine and Kris,

Having spoken with each of you about the tremendous amount of work you’re doing in the sprint towards November, I think both of your heroic efforts could benefit from another set of professional hands in Green Bay.

Dayna Causby, who you’ve spoken with from Elections Group, is available and ready to be in Green Bay as early as the week of October 5. She can help Celestine with Voter Navigators and Dropboxes -- making sure folks are trained and boxes are secure. She can help Kris with Central Count -- making sure it's set up in a way that's safe and efficient for the Clerk's staff and observers. Essentially, she can take on any election tasks that you assign. And, if she’s there with you, I imagine this will cut down on some of the back-and-forth with phone calls and emails.
Deanna Debruler

From: Celestine Jeffreys  
Sent: Monday, July 13, 2020 11:06 PM  
To: 'Tiana Epps-Johnson'  
Subject: Uprising Strategies  

Follow Up Flag: Follow up  
Flag Status: Flagged

Tiana,

I'm not exactly sure how this works, but I received the email below from Mr. Sam Munger.

Is he working with you? As far as I'm concerned I am taking all of my cues from CTCL and work with those you recommend.

Let me know if I should open this door or not.

Celestine

Ms. Jeffreys - I'm reaching out on behalf of the National Vote at Home Institute (www.voteathome.org), a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization made up of former election administrators offering deep expertise and technical assistance on vote by mail best practices. NVAHI works closely with the Center for Tech and Civic Life and is a designated technical assistance provider on the election administration grant recently made to Green Bay and four other cities in Wisconsin. If it's of interest, NVAHI would be happy to present to the ad hoc committee on elections and give an overview of best practices for absentee voting and to discuss additional free technical support and expertise they can offer.

Amaad Rivera, with whom I've worked on a number of voting policy issues, suggested that you would be the best point of contact for the ad hoc committee; if there is someone else I should reach out to instead/in addition, please let me know.

I've attached some additional background on NVAHI. If you have any additional questions, please don't hesitate to drop me a line. Best,

Sam Munger

--

Sam Munger  
Partner, Uprising Strategies  
Washington, DC | Madison, WI  
608.352.3178 (o) | 718.788.6477 (c)  
sam@uprisingstrategies.com

Celestine Jeffreys  
Chief of Staff, Mayor's Office  
City of Green Bay
Hi Celestine & Kris,

Hope all is well in your neck of the woods. Regarding your questions, here’s what I got:

**Michael from National Vote at Home Institute**

Feel free to connect with him. NVAHI is one of the Technical Assistance Partners -- they published the Election Official Communications Toolkit. I did let him know about your RFP that hit the street this week.

**Badger Books**

We encourage you to prioritize spending the grant funds on the programs, people, and technology related directly to the administration of your 2020 elections.

**Reallocating funds for voter outreach**

Are you asking to move funds to the voter outreach bucket? If so, which bucket(s) are you pulling from?

- Increase Absentee Voting
- Launch Poll Worker Recruitment, Training, and Safety Efforts
- Ensure Safe and Efficient Election Day Administration

Please continue to keep me updated and let us know how CTCL and partners can be most helpful for your team.

Stay safe,

Whitney

---

On Tue, Aug 25, 2020 at 10:55 AM Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:

Good morning, Whitney!

A few updates and a question.

First, did you connect the person below to us? I don’t recall meeting him, but that’s perhaps my oversight.

And some updates:
Reallocating funds for voter outreach
Are you asking to move funds to the voter outreach bucket? If so, which bucket(s) are you pulling from?

- Increase Absentee Voting
- Launch Poll Worker Recruitment, Training, and Safety Efforts
- Ensure Safe and Efficient Election Day Administration

Could we take funds from the Badger book line? That’s $283K. If not, what about from the PPE/cough guards or the ballot folder lines?

There are probably 5 organizations in town that are focused on working with disadvantaged populations and/or with voters directly. I thought roughly $5K (each) for their efforts (reimbursable expenses, of course). I don’t have a sense of what’s appropriate, so I haven’t thought of a budget. Whitney, what do you recommend?

Thanks!

Celestine

Ensure Safe and Efficient Election Day Administration

Safe and Efficient Election Day Administration—$426,500
purchase electronic poll books -- $283,500
RFP

purchase high-speed tabulator—$62,000
RFP

purchase ballot opener and folder—$5,000
already purchased
additional staff to process absentee ballots on election day - $5,000
hire new staff, hire temps to replace staff? how does existing staff reassigned accomplish their own work?
PPE—$15,000
already purchased
Okay, I wouldn't want to disrupt anything given the date.

Do you have a few moments to speak, though? I've just been working with Celestine and so want to be sure I'm not overlooking any issues or places where we could help you.

Are you free this afternoon, Friday (any time before 3 PM) or Monday afternoon?

Michael

On Wed, Oct 7, 2020 at 2:59 PM Kris Teske <Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:

We talked to a team already about curing ballots and found that it would take the same amount of time. So we decided our process was working the best for us and it's getting too late in the game to be starting new procedures.

Thank you,

Kris Teske, WCMC

Green Bay City Clerk

100 N. Jefferson St., Rm 106

Green Bay, WI 54301

920-448-3014
State Lead for Wisconsin (Leadership Now Fellow)
National Vote at Home Institute
(310) 980-2872
he/him

Learn more about:
Election Officials Center
Mail Ballot FAQs
Mail Ballot Security
Deanna Debruler

From: Celestine Jeffreys
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 12:43 PM
To: Ryan Chew; Dayna Causby; Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein; Kris Teske
Subject: RE: meeting?

Here’s my schedule. I sent you an invitation to my calendar.

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff
Office of the Mayor
920.448.3006

From: Ryan Chew <ryan@electionsgroup.com>
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 12:22 PM
To: Dayna Causby <dayna@electionsgroup.com>; Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>; Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein <michael@voteathome.org>; Kris Teske <Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: meeting?

Folks,

The discussion of central count was cut short in the last meeting, and the intent was to schedule another call to continue the conversation.

In the next two days, I have meetings at 9:30 and 11:00 tomorrow, and I'm otherwise open. If next week is better, I currently have only an 11:00 meeting Monday, and otherwise Monday and Tuesday are pretty free.

Can you write back with your availability so we can get a call on the calendar?

I don't know city stats, but online I can see that Brown County as a whole has the second highest absentee request rate in the state, and is well above average in terms of the number returned. I hope the city is sharing in that trend, since it will make everything easier if they come back quickly.

Thanks

Ryan Chew
The Elections Group
m: 312 823-3384
ryan@electionsgroup.com

"A republic if you can keep it." - B. Franklin

"Winners always believe they won fairly. The aim of an election official is that losers recognize they lost fairly."
Just wanted to share an example of how Denver does livestream for inspiration.

Best,
Saralynn

On Sun, Oct 11, 2020 at 1:58 PM Saralynn Finn <saralynn@voteathome.org> wrote:
Hey Kris-

I don’t think we’ve gotten a chance to ‘meet’ yet. My name is Saralynn Finn, I’m a Communications Strategist with NVAHI. We just published a white paper in conjunction with the Carter Center with tips for transparency in elections. I’m supporting jurisdictions to implement as many of them as possible.

I know there are concerns about space in your Central Count and also the ongoing COVID situation in Green Bay and the difficulty of social distancing with observers, this seemed like a potential solution to these two issues. Let me know if I can help in any way.

Best,
Saralynn

On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 at 4:03 PM Kris Teske <Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:

Hi Shelby,

This is the first I heard of this so I don’t have anything drawn up yet.

The plan is to have Central Count on 1st floor again (down the three halls). There will not be any DS 200 tabulators in the hall but I am planning on the DS 450 being in the Clerk’s lobby. The observer area will be across the hall from the Clerk Office doors like before.

Let me know if you need anything else.

Kris Teske, WCMC
Green Bay City Clerk
Shelby and Mike,

This sounds fine. Kris is the person to really determine where livestreaming needs to take place. I would imagine at each of the steps of the process not just tabulating the ballots.

---

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff
Office of the Mayor
920.448.3006

---

From: Shelby Edlebeck <Shelby.Edlebeck@greenbaywi.gov>
Sent: Thursday, October 08, 2020 3:04 PM
To: Mike Hronek <mike.hronek@greenbaywi.gov>; Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: Livestream Central Count

I just got off the phone with Saralynn Finn and I’m brainstorming how we can livestream Central Count on election day so that observers do not enter our building.

My first thought is that we could “livestream” by basically just having a Zoom meeting all day.

Set up laptops with their cameras facing the big DS200 machines and having all laptops on mute and joined into the same Zoom meeting. Then we can post that Zoom meeting link on our website for observers. I can probably figure out a way to make sure people cannot unmute themselves and have conversations in the Zoom meeting throughout the day? It would just be a silent “livestream”.

First things first, Mike – do you think we could muster up a few laptops to use that day?
Deanna Debruler

From: Celestine Jeffreys
Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2020 8:10 AM
To: 'Whitney May'
Subject: RE: 2020-07-28 Voter Navigator Job Draft

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Completed

Whitney,

That's a good question, thank you!! I imagine there are lots of people who have graduated from college and are looking for a job. So that's why I raised the stakes. Also, a post-secondary degree would be beneficial because of the quick learning curve, the ability to be independent and organize time, and the need to manage paperwork.

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff, Mayor's Office
City of Green Bay

From: Whitney May [mailto:whitney@techandciviclife.org]
Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 6:46 PM
To: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: Re: 2020-07-28 Voter Navigator Job Draft

I love that y'all are hiring for this position. Helping people navigate the voter journey is so important, especially this year. So thank you for prioritizing this, and you've described it in a really clear way.

Only question for you is about the education requirements. Would a high school diploma qualify someone or do you feel like some college coursework is required to be successful at the job? No wrong answer, just curious.

On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 5:22 PM Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:

What do you think?

--
Whitney May
Director of Government Services
Center for Tech and Civic Life
whitney@techandciviclife.org
(919) 799-6173
she/her
Used By Absentee Ballot Opening Team:

- **Ward Sign**
  - Ward 1

- **Voter Number Sheet**
  - (GAB-104)

- **Absentee Ballot Log**

Used By Ballot Tabulating Team:

- **Ballot Bag**

- **Registered Write-ins**

### Official Ballots
- 90% of your ballots
- So long as the ballot is the correct ward and not damaged, nothing needs to be done other than assigning a voter number

### Emailed
- All emailed ballots need to be reconstructed
- Keep the certificate and empty envelope with your absentee envelopes

### ExpressVote Ballots
- Assign voter number on bottom of ballot and keep a separate stack for each ward
- These do not need to be reconstructed unless there is damage

### Federal Only Ballots
- All Federal only ballots need to be reconstructed
- Only reconstruct the offices that are on the original ballot
- ALL other races are left blank
5. Place the ward sign on the edge of the table, so that it is visible to observers.

6. Split your ward’s envelopes in half with your partner. *Keep them in alphabetical order.*

7. Review the envelopes for:
   - Voter signature
   - Witness signature
   - Witness address (house number, street name, city)
   *If written in red: accept

8. After reviewing all the envelopes and removing any to be rejected, team members should take the envelopes to an envelope opening station in the room.

Return to your table, when the envelopes have been opened.
Partner 1
A. Announce the voter’s name
B. Number the envelope
C. Remove the ballot from the envelope
D. Number the ballot

Partner 2
A. Announce the voter number
B. Cross the number off the voter number sheet
C. Record the number on the Absentee Voter Log

! KEEP EXPRESSVOTE BALLOTS IN A SEPARATE PILE FROM THE OFFICIAL BALLOTS

Processing Emailed Ballots

Partner 1
A. Check for
   ▶ Voter signature
   ▶ Witness signature
   ▶ Witness address
B. Open the envelope attached to the certificate
C. Remove the ballot from the envelope
D. Announce the voter’s name
E. Number the envelope
F. Number the ballot
G. Certificate and envelope are added to Official Ballot envelopes stack
H. Place the ballot in a separate pile to be reconstructed

Partner 2
A. Announce the voter number
B. Cross the number off the voter number sheet
C. Record the number on the Absentee Voter Log

! EMAILED BALLOTS HAVE TO BE RECONSTRUCTED, SEE PAGE 8
If you open a ballot and it is visibly damaged (torn, crinkled, stained, etc.) or sent via email (not an official ballot) you will have to reconstruct the ballot with your partner.

- Both partners must always be present when reconstructing a ballot
- After you have assigned all your voter numbers for the ward, you should then reconstruct ballots
- Count the number of ballots that you need to reconstruct for the ward and get blank ballots from the Central Count Ballot Station

1. **Partner 1**
   - A. Announce the voter’s name
   - B. Number the envelope
   - C. Remove the ballot from the envelope
   - D. Number the ballot
   - E. Place the ballot into a separate pile for reconstruction
   - F. Keep the envelope (or certificate statement) with the other envelopes already processed

2. **Partner 2**
   - A. Announce the voter number
   - B. Cross the number off the voter number sheet
   - C. Record the number on the Absentee Voter Log

3. Proceed to the Central Count Ballot Station to request the number of ballots that you will need to reconstruct
   - *The person that issues the ballots will have initialized/stamped with it “CWV” for the issuing authority

4. For each ballot, determine why you are reconstructing the ballot:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emailed Ballot</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas (Federal Only Ballot)</td>
<td>OS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pencil/Pen Marks (Not Fully Scanned)</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong Ward*</td>
<td>WW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* If the ballot was for the wrong ward, you will need to reconstruct the ballot with votes only for the races that are in both wards
On the reconstructed ballot:
Write the voter's number

Hand your partner the original ballot

Partner 1:
- Read off the votes as the voter recorded

Partner 2:
- Fill in votes on the ballot as the votes

Hand both ballots to Partner 1

Partner 1:
Verify the reconstructed ballot matches

Refold and place the original ballot in the Goldenrod Envelope

The reconstructed ballot is added to the stack of Official Ballots
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>Ballot Prep Table 21 - B</td>
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</table>
With November in mind, I'm cc'ing the designers from Center for Civic Design, Asher & Christopher, CCD is one of the amazing technical assistance partners available to support the WI-5 (we really do need to get WI-5 t-shirts).

Since we've heard interest from you about what other cities are doing, we thought it would be helpful to gather feedback on absentee envelopes and instructions from the WI-5 cohort as a group rather than gathering feedback separately.

- Here are the absentee instructions designed by CCD
  - It's a template in a Word doc
  - You can edit and customize for your city
  - Christopher and Asher are available to consult on design
  - Christopher and Asher have designed this by combining CCD's best practices and language from Madison's instructions.

- Here are the absentee envelopes designed by CCD
  - CCD has been working on the design with WEC
  - CCD + Oxide Design are available to consult on design and printing with your printer
  - Consult can look like adjusting the templates, adding your contact and other information, working with your envelope vendors (if needed) as you fit the layouts into your process (including any size or placement adjustments), or just providing any support, advice, or reviews of proofs.

Do you and your teams have capacity to review these materials and provide questions and feedback to CTCL & CCD before the end of the week?

We know you are all working on tight timelines for printing and collating absentee materials. Please let CTCL & CCD know how we can be most helpful moving forward. If it's useful, grant funds are available for cities that want to print new envelopes.

Thank you,
Whitney & Josh from CTCL
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The Elections Group, 2020

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Planning

How Many Ballot Drop Boxes Do I Need?

Estimating an adequate number of ballot drop boxes can be challenging when you don’t know how many voters will use them. And determining how many to obtain will be constrained by your budget, purchasing process, and ability to deploy multiple boxes before Election Day.

Hiring enough temporary workers to staff ballot security teams is another critical factor. To maintain public trust you should have bipartisan, two-person teams picking up ballots from each drop box on a daily basis. You will need more frequent pick-ups in the days leading up to and including Election Day. Early on, some busy locations may also require frequent pick-ups, perhaps multiple times a day.

The benefits to deploying as many ballot drop boxes as possible include:

- Providing greater access to the election process
- Keeping voters out of busy and stressful polling places on Election Day
- Receiving voted ballots back faster than USPS delivery

A rule of thumb to consider is one drop box for every 10,000-15,000 voters; that is a common requirement in states where mail ballots are the primary voting method. Your geography should also inform how many drop boxes to place. For example, rural, sparsely populated areas may require more drop boxes per capita than densely populated urban areas.

Fewer drop boxes will yield fewer benefits. An overflowing, unstaffed 24-hour ballot drop box can become a serious public relations and voter trust issue. If mailing out ballots is a temporary pandemic alternative, or if you don’t have an adequate budget, temporary indoor ballot drop boxes at staffed locations can provide an adequate solution.

Scaling Up

Ballot drop boxes should be available to voters as soon as ballots are mailed and remain available through the close of polls on Election Day (or as the statute in your state provides). Unstaffed drop boxes are usually available 24 hours per day. Staffed drop boxes or drive-up options are
Election officials should ensure that ballot drop box locations are accessible to voters with disabilities. Consider the following when implementing drop box plans.

1. If a location has only one drop box, the design and placement of that drop box should meet accessibility requirements.

2. If a location has more than one drop box, at least one of the drop boxes should meet accessibility requirements. Any inaccessible drop box at a facility should have a sign with directions to the nearest accessible drop box.

3. A drop box should be placed along an accessible path connected to the nearest ADA parking space, or nearest the passenger drop-off zone, and if applicable, the nearest public transportation stop.

4. If there is no accessible pathway from the parking lot, there should be signs directing the voter to the nearest accessible drop box.

5. Drop box locations inside of buildings should be assessed for accessibility as if they were polling places. For more information, please see the ADA Checklist for Polling Places.
Some things to consider when purchasing 24-hour, unstaffed ballot drop boxes:

- The drop box should be a permanent fixture or a temporary structure that is secured in place to prevent removal or tampering.

- Ensure that the ballot drop box has robust locking mechanisms for both the ballot slot(s) and storage compartment. Ensure that ballots cannot be tampered with while in the drop box, nor removed by anyone other than your authorized ballot retrieval team.

- The opening slot should be large enough to deposit ballot envelopes and designed to keep anyone from pouring liquid into the drop box, or for rainwater to seep into it.

- Drop boxes should be easily recognizable by voters. Plan to purchase or produce permanent, large, weather-proof decals to label the drop boxes with at least your agency name, logo, phone number and the words Official Ballot Drop Box. Use consistent decals on all 24-hour boxes. Additional language may include:

  - No Postage Required
  - Closes at 7 p.m. on Election Day (or relevant time)
  - This Box Under Video Surveillance (if applicable)
  - If required, list any statutory language, such as the number of ballots that can be dropped off by one person in any election.

- Find out how many ballot envelopes each different brand or style of drop box can hold. Ballot return projections will help you to determine the drop box size you will need.

- Consider whether your jurisdiction can or must monitor the ballot drop box with 24/7 video surveillance, where the camera will be mounted, and how footage will be stored. If the drop box is located at another agency’s facility, include mounting and access requirements in the agreement.

- If the ballot drop box is accessible by vehicle, consider whether you can safely locate it on the driver’s side. This can ensure safety by letting the driver cast their ballot without exiting the vehicle. “One-Way” streets/thoroughfares are ideal for installing a box on the driver’s side.

- When planning to receive a shipment of drop boxes, consider multiple important factors.

  - These drop boxes will arrive on pallets and are large and heavy.
  - They should be shipped to a warehouse.
Temporary Ballot Drop Boxes — Indoors

Temporary indoor ballot drop boxes or bags are portable and much smaller than 24-hour drop boxes. Smaller options have handles on the side for carrying and are small enough to rest on a table. Larger options can hold more ballots and are on wheels. Bipartisan teams of two election workers usually monitor these drop boxes or bags.

Ideally, these drop boxes or bags should be available inside every polling place, to offer voters the greatest convenience for dropping off mail ballots. Ballot drop boxes placed inside the polling location may be serviced and staffed by poll workers rather than separate ballot collection teams.

They can also be located inside government buildings, libraries, community centers, and other high traffic areas. Your agency could secure an agreement to have staff from these partnering agencies monitor the drop box during their business hour and during polling hours on Election Day. The agreement should ensure access for your ballot retrieval team to pick up the ballot drop box or bag at scheduled times.
Temporary Ballot Drop Boxes — Drive Through

A drive-through ballot drop box is staffed by bipartisan teams of two election workers on a street or in a parking lot. These workers safely approach a vehicle, accept the voted ballot envelope from the voter, and deposit it into a ballot drop box while the voter observes. At minimum, these workers are equipped with safety vests and badges, a canopy tent for shelter, a table and chairs and locked ballot boxes. This option is usually only deployed on the last few days of the election, including Election Day.

Drive-through locations can be very convenient for voters as they do not need to park or exit their vehicles. They also offer greater operational efficiency for election administrators because they can absorb some of the traffic from high-demand, 24-hour ballot drop boxes on Election Day.

To avoid long lines of cars potentially blocking roadways and/or parking lots, ensure that you have enough staff and ballot drop boxes to move traffic through quickly. Also, some jurisdictions provide “I Voted” stickers at drive-through locations. While this can be a fun idea, it has the potential to slow the pace of cars through the process, creating longer lines. Be sure to consider this impact in your planning.

Some things to consider for temporary, drive-through drop off locations:

- To maximize safety and efficiency, provide instructions and maps to set-up teams. These should map out exactly where set-up should take place and how traffic should flow well in advance of deployment.
What Other Resources Will I Need?

### Additional Supplies and Equipment for All Types of Ballot Drop Boxes

**Bipartisan ballot retrieval teams**
*Enough teams to ensure each drop box is closed/locked at “close of polls” on Election Night*

**Phone tree to reach bipartisan teams while in the field**
*May need to provide mobile phones for those who do not want to use their personal phones*

**Rental cars or fleet vehicles**

**Chain of custody logs**

**Security seals**

**Portable ballot drop boxes or bags for transport**

**High-visibility vests for workers**

**Personal protective equipment such as gloves, masks, and hand sanitizer**

**Accessibility, directional, and electioneering signs (if applicable)**

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporary Indoor</th>
<th>Temporary Drive Through</th>
<th>Permanent 24-Hour</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table(s)</td>
<td>Table(s)</td>
<td>Extra keys made</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chairs</td>
<td>Chairs</td>
<td>Large mail bin placed inside</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cable or bike lock</td>
<td>Pop-up canopy</td>
<td>Flashlights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Road signs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Orange cones</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lanterns</td>
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<td>Flashlights</td>
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<td>Weather appropriate support such as propane heater and rain gear</td>
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00217
Other Safety and Security Measures

**Unstaffed** drop boxes placed outdoors should be securely fastened to prevent moving or tampering. For example, fasten the drop box to concrete or an immovable object. This will prevent unauthorized removal of the drop box.

**Staffed** drop boxes have several options, but all options should take into consideration additional security measures when the ballot drop site is not staffed. Safeguarding the drop box during unstaffed hours could mean the drop box is inaccessible to the public when not in use. The box should be secured in a locked room, sealed with a tamper-evident seal, and if possible, under video surveillance. Staffed drop boxes should be securely fastened to a stationary surface or to an immovable object, and/or placed behind a counter, and/or portable so they can be transported to a curbside area or a mobile voting area. When in use, these drop boxes should be constantly monitored by election officials or other designated representatives.

Work with law enforcement to include frequent patrols of unstaffed drop boxes. In some communities, it might also be appropriate to develop a network of citizens willing to regularly patrol unstaffed drop boxes.

Work with the public works department and law enforcement to make drive through locations safe and secure.

Ballot Retrieval

Driving Routes, Frequency, and Staffing Needs

Once the locations of your ballot drop boxes are set, you should begin planning daily routes for ballot retrieval. This includes sending teams to visit all ballot drop boxes - permanent and temporary. The frequency of pickups may vary in the beginning, every other day versus every day, and become more frequent - multiple times per day - the closer you get to Election Day.

The time it takes to retrieve ballots will depend on the type of ballot drop box used. Ballot retrieval teams will be able to park close to most permanent, 24-hour drop boxes. They will need to transfer the contents of the drop boxes to portable bags or boxes, seal the boxes, complete their chain of custody paperwork, and load the portable boxes into a vehicle.

Temporary, staffed ballot drop boxes are usually located inside a building. This means ballot retrieval teams will need to park and walk into the building to the room where the temporary ballot drop box is located. Most often, they will switch out the full ballot drop box for an empty...
of the election, including 40% of ballots cast on Election Day. You will need to retrieve ballots multiple times per day from your busier ballot drop boxes the closer you get to and on Election Day.

Other important items to consider when creating your retrieval plan:

- Your plan needs to be flexible. If voter turnout is higher than anticipated, you may need to retrieve ballots multiple times per day sooner than you had planned to scale up.

- On the Monday evening before Election Day, you must retrieve ballots from all drop boxes at the end of the day so they do not fill overnight and to maximize the number of ballots you can count on Election Day.

- On Election Night, you must close all drop boxes simultaneously with closing the polls. This will take significant staffing and coordination.

- It is important to track as much data about this process as possible. Retain it for future planning, including how many ballots you retrieve from each drop box each day and how many retrieval runs were needed to each drop box each day. This data can be obtained from ballot logs and reviewed after the election.

**Staffing Needs**

Use the mapped driving routes and frequency of retrieval to determine how many teams and vehicles you will need and for how long. For example, in the first few weeks after ballots are mailed out you might only need three teams of two (six temporary workers) and three vehicles. That number might increase significantly or even double as you start the week leading up to Election Day.

The biggest staffing challenge for ballot retrieval will be at the close of polls on Election Night. You will need bipartisan teams to close and seal each ballot drop box right at the close of polls (or as the statute in your state provides). Many jurisdictions recruit staff from sister agencies, since drop box closing teams do not require full poll worker training. Remember, these ballot retrieval teams will need to be bipartisan, even those staff recruited from other agencies, and may need to be sworn in as election workers.

As mentioned in the overview, accommodations for COVID-19 and the need for social distancing will affect your staffing decisions. Asking two unrelated workers to drive together in the same car may be a challenge. You will need to accommodate any retrieval team member requests to travel in separate cars in tandem. The steps for setup and the daily retrieval of ballots should also follow the six-foot distancing requirements.
From: Juno, Sandy L. <Sandy.Juno@browncountywi.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2020 11:59 AM
To: Judnic, Nathan - ELECTIONS <Nathan.Judnic@wisconsin.gov>
Subject: C-Green Bay Central Count concerns
Importance: High

Nate, I have concerns about this person from an outside organization at the central county location for the City of Green Bay. I observed that he has a laptop, printer, and cell phone assessible within the central count facility. Likewise, we were told he is an observer for the outside organization that gave them a grant and his position is paid for by that even though he’s from a different org. I observed him interacting with the poll workers and advising them on matters.

I believe the central count location is tainted by the influence of a person working for an outside organization affecting the election.

Please explain how grant money from a private outside organization and employee from a private outside organization does not violate election laws for free and fair elections?

Sandy Juno
Brown County Clerk
305 E. Walnut St., Room 120
Green Bay, WI 54301
920.819.9046 mobile
920.448.4021 office

From: Michael Spitzer-Rubensteln <michael@voteathome.org>
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2020 10:02 AM
To: Juno, Sandy L. <Sandy.Juno@browncountywi.gov>
Subject: Question about Green Bay Central Count

Hi Sandy,
I’m Michael Spitzer-Rubensteln, an advisor to the City of Green Bay through the National Vote at Home Institute. I’m helping the city set up Central Count for Tuesday.

I heard from Kim there was some sort of issue with using DS200s at Central Count. I’m trying to get the full backstory to advise her and the mayor. Do you have a moment to speak this morning? My cell phone is 310-980-2872.

Thank you,
Michael

Michael Spitzer-Rubensteln
State Lead for Wisconsin (Leadership Now Fellow)
National Vote at Home Institute
(310) 980-2872
Bob Spindell, Vice-Chair
Nick Boerke, Chair
Overview and Update

Reform Task Force
RPW Election
Grassroots
- Interface with Legislative Party and
- Address larger issues
- Form sub-committees to accomplish goals
- Reform legislation
- Review and recommendations on election
- Identification of comprehensive priorities for Task Force Actions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force Priorities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Voter ID Law</td>
<td>Ballot chain-of-custody</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>Election &amp; Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midnight dumping of ballots; early counting of ballots</td>
<td>Central count locations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Election software and machines</td>
<td>Election software and machines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Create sub-committee to address election software and machines</td>
<td>Election software and machines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ballot secrecy for YEC to seal personal information, including signature and ID</td>
<td>Sensitive information of absent ballots and voter personal information</td>
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<td>ボールdeadline for ballot secrecy</td>
<td>Funding from outside organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Include/organize votes</td>
<td>Election observer rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election inspectors</td>
<td>Observers / Inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election and execute recruitment and training of R.P.W.</td>
<td>Election and execute recruitment and training of R.P.W.</td>
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</tbody>
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Identification of Task Force Priorities
WEC Reform and/or Replacement

Inspectors to be nominated by RFW
Recruitment and training of ELECTRON
Sub-Committees Formed
WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION
Administering Wisconsin's Election Laws

WEC Approves Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS Electronic Voting Systems

Priority
Information Only

Date
July 2, 2021 - 4:00pm

To
Wisconsin County Clerks
Wisconsin Municipal Clerks
City of Milwaukee Election Commission
Milwaukee County Election Commission

From
Meagan Wolfe, Administrator

Attachment

Size

Clerk Communication D-Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS.pdf
139.56 KB

Final Commission Memo Test Report for Dominion D-Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS.pdf
1.81 MB

DVS DSuite 5.5-C Certification and Scope 07-09-2020.pdf
805.54 KB

On June 2, 2021, the Wisconsin Elections Commission ("Commission") approved the Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS voting systems for sale and use in the State of Wisconsin. No electronic voting equipment may be offered for sale or implemented in Wisconsin unless first approved and certified by the Elections Commission.

Democracy Suite 5.5-C is a federally tested, and EAC certified, paper based, digital scan voting system powered by the Democracy Suite software platform. Democracy Suite 5.5-CS is a federally tested, paper based, digital scan voting system powered by the Democracy Suite software platform, which includes wireless modem capabilities for the transmission of unofficial election results to the county on election night. The systems consist of seven major components:

1. Election Management System (EMS) server.
2. EMS client workstation (Windows 10 powered desktop and/or laptop computer).
3. ImageCast Evolution, a polling place scanner and tabulator, which also meets ADA compliance requirements as a ballot marking device.
4. ImageCast X Ballot Marking Device, an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant vote capture device for polling place use.
5. ImageCast X Direct Record Electronic voting device, an ADA compliant vote capture device for polling place use.
6. ImageCast Precinct 2, a polling place scanner and tabulator.
7. ImageCast Central, a high-speed scanner and tabulator for use in central count locations.

As part of the certification, the Commission commonly adds certain conditions to which the vendor must adhere in order to maintain approval in Wisconsin. While several of the certification conditions were standard for every voting system, there were some worth noting that are specific to Democracy Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS. See below for representative examples.

1. Any municipality using a ballot marking device (BMD) approved as part of Democracy Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS, must include ballots marked by that device as part of the pre-audited group of ballots used to conduct its pre-election logic and accuracy voting equipment test, under Wis. Stat. § 5.84(1). This includes ballots marked by the ImageCast Evolution tabulator BMD function, ImageCast X DRE, or the ImageCast X BMD. While the inclusion of ballots marked by a device in the pre-election logic and
WEC Approves Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS Electronic Voting Systems

Priority
Information Only

Date
July 2, 2021 - 4:00pm

To
Wisconsin County Clerks
Wisconsin Municipal Clerks
City of Milwaukee Election Commission
Milwaukee County Election Commission

From
Meagan Wolfe, Administrator

Attachment
Clerk Communication D-Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS.pdf
139.56 KB

Final Commission Memo Test Report for Dominion D-Suite 5.5 C and 5.5-CS.pdf
1.81 MB

DVS DSuite 5.5-C Certification and Scope 07-09-2020.pdf
805.54 KB

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Democracy Suite 5.5-C is a federally tested, and EAC certified, paper based, digital scan voting system powered by the Democracy Suite software platform. Democracy Suite 5.5-CS is a federally tested, paper based, digital scan voting system powered by the Democracy Suite software platform, which includes wireless modem capabilities for the transmission of unofficial election results to the county on election night. The systems consist of seven major components:

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As part of the certification, the Commission commonly adds certain conditions to which the vendor must adhere in order to maintain approval in Wisconsin. While several of the certification conditions were standard for every voting system, there were some worth noting that are specific to Democracy Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS. See below for representative examples.

1. Any municipality using a ballot marking device (BMD) approved as part of Democracy Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS, must include ballots marked by that device as part of the pre-audited group of ballots used to conduct its pre-election logic and accuracy voting equipment test, under Wis. Stat. § 5.84(1). This includes ballots marked by the ImageCast Evolution tabulator BMD function, ImageCast X DR6, or the ImageCast X BMD. While the inclusion of ballots marked by a device in the pre-election logic and
WEC Approves Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS Electronic Voting Systems

Priority
Information Only

Date
July 2, 2021 - 4:00pm

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DATE: January 8, 2021

TO: All Wisconsin County and Municipal Election Officials

FROM: Meagan Wolfe
Administrator

Richard Rydecki
Assistant Administrator

SUBJECT: Indefinitely Confined Absentee Request Confirmation Process

Overview

The Wisconsin Elections Commission has received questions from clerks about the increase in indefinitely confined absentee voters and their ability to contact those voters to verify the status of their absentee request. It is allowable for municipal clerks to contact these voters for confirmation that they remain indefinitely confined, but they should do so using discretion and respect to voters’ privacy regarding their medical and disability status.

WEC has developed a process that is outlined in this communication in response to clerk interest in tools and procedures to contact these voters to confirm their status. This process is optional, and municipalities are not required to contact these voters. Each municipality should decide if they have the resources and interest in sending a voter mailing designed to allow voters to change or cancel their absentee request.

Due to the spread of COVID-19 in 2020, many voters requested absentee ballots as indefinitely confined voters. Voters who were indefinitely confined for the 2020 election(s) may no longer be indefinitely confined. Therefore, clerks may contact these voters and provide them with the following options:

1. **Change their request**: This should be done in writing (mail, email or in-person delivery) and should involve the voter confirming they are no longer indefinitely confined and prompt the voter to send their municipal clerk a copy of their photo ID to receive an absentee ballot for a future election, if it is not already on file.

2. **Continue their request**: Voters may use the form to confirm they are still indefinitely confined and want to continue to receive absentee ballots, but they are not required to do so.

3. **Cancel their absentee request**: Any voter who would like to cancel their absentee request should also provide written notice of that requested change.

To address clerk’s concerns about the increase in indefinitely confined voters, Commission staff developed an optional process that provides resources to assist clerks in updating their voter rolls. Resources include:

1. **A template letter** for new indefinitely confined voters from the 2020 elections.
2. **Mail merge** instructions for clerks who want to use the template letter.
Appendix F: Voting System Standards, Testing Protocols and Procedures Pertaining to the Use of Communication Devices

PART I: PROPOSED TESTING STANDARDS

Applicable VVSG Standard

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Access to Election Data

Provisions shall be made for authorized access to election results after closing of the polls and prior to the publication of the official canvass of the vote. Therefore, all systems must be capable of generating an export file to communicate results from the election jurisdiction to the Central processing location on election night after all results have been accumulated. The system may be designed so that results may be transferred to an alternate database or device. Access to the alternate file shall in no way affect the control, processing, and integrity of the primary file or allow the primary file to be affected in any way.

Security

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Accuracy

A voting system must be capable of accurately recording and reporting votes cast. Accuracy provisions shall be evidenced by the inclusion of control logic and data processing methods, which incorporate parity, and checksums, or other equivalent error detection and correction methods.

Data Integrity
2. Set up a telephone line simulator that contains as many as eight phone lines

3. Perform communication suite for election night reporting using a bank with as many as seven analog modems:
   a. Connect the central site election management system to the telephone line simulator and connect the modems to the remaining telephone line ports
   b. Setup the phone line numbers in the telephone line simulator
   c. Use the simulated election to upload the election results
      i. Use at least eight tabulators in different reporting units
      ii. Use as many as two tabulators within the same reporting units
   d. Simulate the following transmission anomalies
      i. Attempt to upload results from a tabulating device to a computer which is not part of the voting system
      ii. Attempt to upload results from a non-tabulating device to the central site connected to the modem bank
      iii. Attempt to load stress by simulating a denial of service (DOS) attack or attempt to upload more than one polling location results (e.g., ten or more polling locations)

   **Wireless Capability Test Plan**

   **Test Objective:** To transfer the results from the tabulator to EMS via a wireless network correctly.

   **Test Plan:**

   1. Attempt to transmit results prior to the closing of the polls and printing of results tape.

   2. Perform wireless communication suite for election night reporting:
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      d. If possible, simulate a weak signal
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   **Test Conclusions for Wired and Wireless Transmission**

   - System must be capable of transferring 100% of the contents of results test packs without error for each successful transmission.
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(Observer) pg. 111: Lisa Kiep; 11/27/20
- No legal rep present while corrected ballots were verified.

(Observer) pg. 109: Deborah Kanarowski; 11/30/20
- Clerk was remaking ballots without an attorney present.

(Observer) pg. 86: Cordie Grothjan; 11/20/20
Clerk was overheard denigrating Trump observer.

(Observer) pg. 87: Elizabeth Rhodehamel; 11/20/20
Observer asked tabulator a question. Tabulator instructed observer not to ask him questions. When tabulator was asked to slow down, he rolled his eyes.

(Observer) pg. 89: Deborah Gordon; 11/20/20
- Stack of ballots removed before Trump observers could audit ballots. Possible, ballots were not recounted.

(Observer) pg. 92: Alex Ruggiers; 11/20/20
- Clerk's supervisor told clerk not to slow down so Trump observer couldn't observe. Possibly occurred during ballot counting process.