pg. 93; Sandy Allredge; 11/20/20
- Tabulator commented on unusually high number of absentee ballots.

pg. 73; Kimberly Gwatton; 11/03/20
- Observer had difficulty seeing ballots due to distance and plexiglass. Observer could barely hear due to masks.

pg. 71; Marty Probst; 11/03/20
- Observer was not able to meaningfully observe due to loud distance restriction, masks which inhibited hearing, and room structure.

pg. 80; Paulette Zierhuss; 11/04/20
- Tabulator refused to slow down while flipping ballots despite observer's objection. It took the legal team + video intervention to get tabulator to comply.

pg. 52; David Vanderburg; 11/11/20
Tabulator passing ballots too fast.

pg. 70; Amy Holden; 11/23/20
- Tabulator instructed observer that objected ballots would be left on table until after Ward.
• Furthermore, system must demonstrate secure rate of transmission consistent with security requirements.

• System must demonstrate the proper functionality to ensure ease of use for clerks on election night.

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Additionally, staff recommends that, as a condition/continuing condition of approval, DVS shall:

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- the interruption of electrical power, generated or induced electromagnetic radiation.
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**Reliability**

Successful Completion of the Logic and Accuracy test shall be determined by two criteria:
- The number of failures in transmission
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Test Plan:

1. Attempt to transmit results prior to the closing of the polls and printing of results tape
3. A process to receive a spreadsheet listing all new indefinitely confined absentee voters who made a request for any election since March 1, 2020 to use to create the mail merge. If a voter does not respond to your communication, you may not deactivate their absentee request if they returned their November 3, 2020 ballot. This letter also does not replace the 30-day indefinitely confined notice for voters who failed to return a ballot. If an indefinitely confined absentee voter did not return their absentee ballot for November 3, you may proceed with the 30-day notice and deactivate their request if they do not respond within 30 days. WisVote instructions for generating this letter and completing this process can be found in the manual and training materials available on the WBC Learning Center.

**Process Outline and Resources**

The processes and resources found below are designed to be adapted to fit your municipality’s needs and they may be customized. It is not required to use the mail merge or the template letter, and you may use a different process if you prefer or only have a limited number of voters to contact.

1. **Template Letter**

The template indefinitely confined letter doubles as a form for voters to return directly to the municipal clerk to confirm their status. You may edit this letter to fit your municipality’s needs and place it on your municipal letterhead. The Commission encourages clerks to be sensitive to voter’s privacy about their medical and disability status. The letter emphasizes the definition and self-certification aspects of indefinitely confined voters, highlights the photo ID requirement for regular absentee voters, and states that voters will not be deactivated if they do not return the letter.

2. **Mail Merge Instructions**

If you are sending this letter to a significant number of indefinitely confined voters, it may be faster for you to use the mail merge feature from Microsoft. This feature allows you to use the spreadsheet provided by the Wisconsin Elections Commission to create multiple letters that are customized for each voter.

These instructions review how to use the mail merge feature step-by-step. You do not have to use this process. Prior to running the mail merge, please make sure you enter your contact information and the date at the top of the letter. The lines from the spreadsheet that will be merged are voter’s address line 1; address line 2; city, state, zip code; and voter name.

3. **Voter Data from the Wisconsin Elections Commission**

The Wisconsin Elections Commission can create a spreadsheet for each municipality that contains every new indefinitely confined voter between the Spring Election on April 7, 2020 to the General Election on November 3, 2020. When you receive your list, you can review the indefinitely confined voters for your specific municipality and use that information for the mail merge. The voter’s address listed on the spreadsheet is their mailing address.
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2. Clerks and election inspectors shall ensure that external modems are secured prior to, during, and after every election, with proper chain of custody documentation utilized.

3. Election inspectors must continue to check both the write-in bin and main ballot bin for validly cast write-in votes after the close of polls in each election, and not rely upon the optional write-in report.

4. Any absentee ballot returned by the tabulation equipment with an overvote or crossover vote notification must be reviewed by election inspectors prior to being overridden or remade. If necessary, ballots must be remade pursuant to approved procedures listed in the Election Day and Election Administration manuals.

5. Any absentee ballot returned that has been marked with red ink by the voter must be remade by election inspectors prior to any attempt at processing on the tabulation equipment.

6. ICE X BMD and DRE be programmed to present only one contest per page.

7. Voter ballot activation cards used as part of the ICE X BMD or DRE be reprogrammed after each use and set to expire after one hour.

8. Automatically return marked ballots to the voter for physical review prior to casting when marked using the ICE tabulator BMD function.

9. The ImageCast X ballot marking device has been certified for hand counting only and ballots marked using this equipment cannot be counted using any of the tabulation equipment certified as part of this system.

A full list of conditions included in the Democracy Suite 5.5-C and 5.5-CS certification, as well as detailed WEC testing information, can be found in the attached Commission memorandum.

For additional information regarding this voting system, please refer to the attached Commission memorandum, certification letter, and U.S. Election Assistance Commission certificate. If you have any questions, please contact the Help Desk at elections@wi.gov or (608) 261-2028. Thank you.

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tele (608) 266-8005 | fax (608) 267-0500 | tty 1-800-947-3529 | e-mail elections@wi.gov

Toll-Free Voter Help Line: 1-866-VOTE-WIS
Election Integrity Dashboard

https://wisgop.org/election-integrity/
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<th>Task</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absentee ballot applications and reasons therefor</td>
<td>Draft and pass legislation that requires application for each absentee ballot with specific reasons; consider changing back to an &quot;excuse&quot; state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absentee ballot receipt deadline</td>
<td>Seek declaratory judgment regarding and/or legislatively strengthen deadline for absentee ballot to be counted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk actions regarding absentee ballots</td>
<td>Seek declaratory judgment regarding WEC guidance on allowing clerks to complete missing information on absentee ballots and enforcing 28-day requirement; pass legislation requiring witness for any AB changes by clerks and prohibit clerks from sending out extra ballots or creating proof of residency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Indefinitely confined&quot; voters</td>
<td>Pass legislation and/or obtain declaratory judgment limiting and/or eliminating use of indefinitely confined status as a voter ID loophole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting &quot;events&quot;</td>
<td>Seek declaratory judgment regarding and/or pass legislation prohibiting or limiting voting &quot;events&quot; such as &quot;Democracy in the Park;&quot; Pass legislation or enact rules regarding nursing homes voting and special voting deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot Harvesting / Drop boxes</td>
<td>Pass legislation and/or enact regulations and safeguards with regard to ballot drop boxes, limit their use and/or prohibit their use and prohibit &quot;ballot harvesting&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-person absentee voting and locations; curbside voting</td>
<td>Pass legislation limiting the timeframe and locations of in-person absentee voting; Seek declaratory judgment that curbside voting is only allowed on Election Day, not during IPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal transparency and reporting</td>
<td>Pass legislation and/or WEC requirements for consistent and detailed absentee ballot data reporting, including ballots sent, received and not returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require signature verification on all Absentee Ballots</td>
<td>Pass legislation requiring signature matches between registration files and absentee ballot certificates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Task Force Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Last</th>
<th>County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>Nick</td>
<td>Boerke</td>
<td>Ozaaukee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chair</td>
<td>Bob</td>
<td>Spindell</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Ken</td>
<td>Dragotta</td>
<td>Waukesha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Ardis</td>
<td>Cerny</td>
<td>Waukesha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Terry</td>
<td>Dittrich</td>
<td>Waukesha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Rick</td>
<td>Baas</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Debbie</td>
<td>Morin</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Jess</td>
<td>Ripp</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Billie</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Dane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Don</td>
<td>Zimmer</td>
<td>Manitowoc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Scott</td>
<td>Bolstad</td>
<td>Eau Claire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Maripat</td>
<td>Krueger</td>
<td>Dunn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Carolyn</td>
<td>Loechner</td>
<td>Dunn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Stephanie</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>Pierce</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Brian</td>
<td>Jennings</td>
<td>Florence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>James</td>
<td>Fitzgerald</td>
<td>Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPW</td>
<td>Andrew</td>
<td>Hitt</td>
<td>Outagamie</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPW</td>
<td>Mark</td>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>Dane</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPW</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Moskowitz</td>
<td>Dane</td>
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</table>
To: Wolfe, Meagan - ELECTIONS <Meagan.Wolfe@wisconsin.gov>; Rydecki, Richard H - ELECTIONS <Richard.Rydecki@wisconsin.gov>
Subject: FW: C-Green Bay Central Count concerns

FYI.

Nathan W. Judnic
Staff Attorney
Wisconsin Elections Commission
212 East Washington Ave, Third Floor
P.O. Box 7984
Madison, WI 53707-7984
608.267.0953 (direct)
608.228.7697 (cell)
608.267.0500 (fax)
nathan.judnic@wi.gov

From: Judnic, Nathan - ELECTIONS
Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2020 1:03 PM
To: 'Juno, Sandy L.' <Sandy.Juno@browncountywi.gov>
Subject: RE: C-Green Bay Central Count concerns

Hi Sandy, thanks for the email. We've had several conversations with Green Bay leading up to today and are aware that they were going to be using consultants from some outside groups today. We've discussed the roles these individuals were going to be assigned and told them that while there is nothing that would prohibit the City of from using these individuals, the inspectors and the absentee board of canvassers working the location are the individuals that are to be making decisions, not the consultants. I have talked to Kim, the Deputy Clerk who was going to reach out to the central count folks and reinforce this guidance.

I would certainly like to be made aware of issues or decisions that have been “tainted” at the central count, I'm not 100% sure what you mean. As far as grant money, etc., I'm again interested if there are issues or decision that have been made that you think we should look into. I'm only really aware of the recent litigation related to grants given to municipalities which included Green Bay, Milwaukee, Madison and a couple others, but I was under the impression that case was dismissed and the US Supreme Court chose not to take it up prior to the election.

Let me know if there is anything else I can help with on this.

Thanks
Nate

Nathan W. Judnic
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Voter Outreach and Communication

Promoting the use and availability of ballot drop boxes is essential to their success. Use all of the communication tools and resources at your disposal as soon as practical to publicize ballot drop box locations, hours and notable accessibility features.

For example, use your regular print and electronic materials, website, social media, video, and news releases to announce ballot drop box locations and share a link to a comprehensive list and/or map of ballot drop boxes.

You can also include a list of ballot drop-off locations in your mail ballot instructions, voter information guide and sample ballot publications. Depending on how many locations you have, you may be able to print them on the mail ballot envelope as well. If there are too many locations to fit, perhaps include a link or QR code on the envelope to direct voters to your list of locations.

Your election website will be the optimal resource for voters to find a ballot drop-off location. Create a web page for Ballot Drop-Off Locations. Include a list of all location names, addresses, hours and embed a link to a Google map for each. If there is a change to the ballot drop box plan, it should be noted on your official website within 24 hours.

You can also create and embed a map of all ballot box locations using Google My Maps. First, create a list of locations as a .csv file, with separate columns for location name, address, city, state and zip code, hours, and type of ballot drop box. Then visit www.google.com/mymaps and follow instructions to import the map. You’ll need to create a Google account if you don’t already have one.

Issue a news release and photos if you have installed one or more new 24-hour ballot drop boxes in your community. Share it with your own employee news channels, local news media, as well as jurisdictions for newsletters and public television news shows.

Ask the clerk or communications team in your local cities and towns if you can submit a contributed article for their newsletter, blog or website regarding the election. Be sure to request a deadline and word count. Describe options for voters and indicate where citizens within your jurisdiction can find their nearest ballot drop box and polling place. You can also ask them to embed your election page link on their own webpages.

Another creative idea is to develop a 'Find My Nearest' web-based tool to help voters find the ballot drop box that is closest to them. A user will type in an address or allow the tool to use their device’s ‘location services’ to identify their current location. The tool would then populate with a map and list of the nearest three or four ballot drop off locations. This will require knowledge of ArcGIS or Google Maps, and will likely require support from your IT department to create.
drop box, complete the chain of custody paperwork, and carry the full drop box or bag back to their vehicle. The process for temporary drive-through locations will be similar.

Driving Routes

The process of retrieving ballots will be most efficient if retrieval teams are able to follow pre-planned driving routes. This can be made easier with mapping technology. Some election offices use commercial software such as Routific and Esri Workforce. Google Maps is a free option that most staff will be familiar with and find easy to use.

When using Google Maps, begin by mapping out a route that you think can be completed in four hours. Identify each location, including the starting and ending location (typically the election office). Assume that the necessary steps at each location will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. Adjust the number of drop boxes on the route until you are able to achieve a route that can be completed in roughly four hours. Be sure to map it during the same times your retrieval team members will be on the road to account for daily traffic patterns. Also consider adding in break times as needed for your retrieval teams.

Consider using mobile phone tracking applications or GPS spot trackers as a way to ensure the assigned route is followed without deviation and that your retrieval team is on time. This may also help document your chain of custody.

Frequency of Retrieval

The frequency with which you retrieve ballots from each ballot drop box depends on multiple factors, including:

- Timing (How close to Election Day is it?)
- Projected and actual voter turnout
- The number of ballot boxes you have
- How many ballots each box can hold
- The geography of your jurisdiction and distance retrieval teams have to travel

Generally, it is important to retrieve ballots at least once per day from the first day ballots may be returned. This will ensure ballot security and the ballots can enter your processing operation as quickly as possible. From there, structure your retrieval plan around a slowly building stream of ballots. Jurisdictions have seen as few as 20% of ballots cast by mail deposited in drop boxes during the first two weeks and as many as 55%–60% of ballots deposited during the last two days.
How Do We Secure Ballot Boxes?

The location and type of drop box can affect the security measures needed to ensure both actual and perceived security.

Locking Requirements

All drop boxes shall be secured by a lock and a tamper-evident seal. Only an election official and a designated ballot retriever shall have access to the keys and/or combination of the lock. If your drop box(es) are secured by a key lock, be sure to make copies of each key and store them securely at your election facility.

Video Requirements

If feasible, both temporary and 24-hour drop boxes should be monitored by a video security surveillance system, or an internal camera that can capture digital images and/or video.

A video security surveillance system is especially critical for unstaffed, 24-hour boxes and can include existing systems on county, city, or private buildings. The video system should be robust enough to capture and store video for the full time the ballot drop box(es) are open to receive ballots during an election. These videos may be considered an election record, and thus may need to be retained for a certain period of time after each election, depending on your state laws.

The easiest way to provide video surveillance is to position your ballot drop box within view of an existing video surveillance system. If you need to install your own system, work with your city/county IT, facilities, or law enforcement division to see if there are similar systems used throughout the city/county. Chances are your jurisdiction already has a vendor set up for this type of equipment.

Bipartisan Election Workers (drive-through locations)

Drive-through ballot drop boxes must be monitored very closely by election workers to ensure that someone does not drive-off with a ballot drop box.
- Pop-up tents, tables, chairs, safety cones, and portable space heaters can often be borrowed from other government agencies (Sheriff's Office, Public Works, Parks & Recreation, Facilities or Fleet) or rented from a party or restaurant supply company.

Additional supplies are necessary for staff working outdoors, such as spotlights and flashlights for working in the dark, and apparel for inclement weather.
Factors to consider when purchasing temporary, indoor ballot drop boxes or bags:

- Consider durability, weight and sizing options, and which would be a better solution for your facility—a smaller, tabletop box, a bag, or a larger box on wheels.

- Determine how many ballots each drop box or bag can hold and your requirements for replacing or emptying it. Ballot drop boxes fill up quickly, especially approaching and on Election Day.

- Ensure that the drop box or bag cannot be opened or moved by unauthorized persons. It should have a lock to protect ballot envelopes, and ideally should be secured to an immovable object with a padlock or chain lock (such as a bicycle lock).

- Ensure that there is a place on the drop box or bag for a zip-tie style security seal for chain of custody.

- The drop box or bag should be easily recognizable by voters. Plan to purchase or produce decals to label it with your agency name, branding, the purpose of the drop box and useful information (see the section on Voter Outreach and Communication).
Installation may not take place immediately and you may need space to store them.

A forklift may be needed to move them.

While drop boxes have few moving parts, it is crucial that you verify the locks and doors are functioning properly and that all ballot slots are unobstructed before acceptance.

To install drop boxes you may need an agreement or permit from the local governing body before installing a drop box. Once an agreement and/or permit is secured, you may need to coordinate work with other offices to complete installation. Some items to consider:

- New concrete may need to be poured, which may extend the timeline for the boxes to be safe and fully functional.

- Consider drop box weight and bulk before shipping them out for installation. Consider which staff and vehicles are appropriate, and how the boxes will move in and out of the vehicle cargo area.

- Securing the boxes will require tradespeople whose schedules may not be flexible if shipment is delayed.

- Early and regular communications will help keep the team working together.
Purchasing Considerations

The type of ballot drop box(es) you use will depend on your plan and budget. Drop boxes come in several sizes, types, and different construction materials to withstand vandalism and inclement weather and to prevent removal. The following section will cover three types of ballot boxes: a 24-hour permanent box, a temporary indoor box and a temporary drive-through ballot drop-off.

24-Hour Unstaffed Ballot Drop Box

A 24-hour ballot drop box mimics a USPS blue mailbox. It is a permanent metal structure accessible by vehicle or on foot in the public right-of-way, and should be well-secured to the ground. Styles vary. These can be installed on your jurisdiction’s property, or you can arrange to install one at a partnering public agency (see list in previous section.) This usually means securing a written agreement with property owners to locate and secure these drop boxes on their property before you purchase them. A list of drop box vendors is located in Appendix A.
typically offered on a more limited schedule, such as during business hours and full polling hours on Election Day.

If adequate staffing is a problem, consider starting with fewer drop boxes and scaling up to the full number you need closer to Election Day. Note that scaling up over time presents P.R. challenges. You will need to clearly publicize drop box locations, plus the dates and times that each location is available.

Where Do I Place Them?

To choose ballot drop box locations, election officials should consider these factors at a minimum:

- Concentrations of population
- Concentrations of historically higher mail-voting populations
- Geographic distance and features
- Voter convenience
- Proximity to public transportation
- Community-based locations
- Security, including lighting, visibility, and security cameras

The Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL) created a Ballot Drop-off Location Criteria Planner to help jurisdictions evaluate potential ballot drop-off locations. The planner is located in Appendix B.

Unless prohibited by law, a staffed ballot drop box should be provided at every polling location. This will require separate drop boxes for mail ballots and in-person paper ballots (when not scanned at the polling location).

Additional locations for staffed drop boxes may include, but are not limited to: city offices, public libraries, county offices, assisted living facilities, senior living communities, college campuses, local businesses and shopping centers, and offices of community organizations. At these locations, the voter may need to leave their vehicle and enter the building. A drive-up option could allow voters to deposit their ballots and remain in their vehicles.
Overview

Ballot drop boxes offer a secure, convenient alternative for voters to cast their completed mail ballots. They save money for voters in jurisdictions where return postage is not prepaid, and they can reduce costs for election authorities where postage is paid.

Voters like ballot drop boxes. In jurisdictions where vote-by-mail is prevalent, as many as 80 percent of voters choose to return their ballot at a ballot drop box.

A ballot drop box program can help build public trust in the election process. Ballot drop boxes can reassure voters who mistrust the postal system because of lost or delayed mail, or who worry about someone potentially tampering with their ballot. Ballot drop boxes also provide a solution for voters who are concerned about their signature being exposed to anyone outside of their local election office.

For election officials, ballot drop boxes ensure ballots are received in time to be processed. This is critical since many voters wait until Election Day to return their ballots.

This guide is divided into three sections.

- **Planning** will help election officials decide the type, location, equipment and staffing for three types of ballot drop boxes.

- **Voter Outreach and Communication** contains suggestions for promoting ballot drop box convenience and availability, and to publicize your request and return deadlines.

- **Execution** includes sample forms that can be used separate from this guide to train temporary staff and used as a daily checklists and chain of custody logs, including a section for Election Night.

As you review this guide, keep in mind accommodations for COVID-19 and social distancing requirements. For example, asking two unrelated workers to share a car ride may be a challenge. COVID-related considerations are addressed in the Planning section.
Guide to Ballot Drop Boxes

Issued by The Elections Group
Ballot Prep Table 22 - A
Ballot Prep Table 22 - B
Ballot Prep Table 23 - A
Ballot Prep Table 23 - B
Ballot Prep Table 24 - A
Ballot Prep Table 24 - B
Envelope Opener 1
Envelope Opener 2
Envelope Opener 3
Envelope Opener 4
DS200 Tabulator 1
DS200 Tabulator 2
DS450 Tabulator - A
DS450 Tabulator - B
Reconstructor Table 1 - A
Reconstructor Table 1 - B
Reconstructor Table 2 - A
Reconstructor Table 2 - B
Ballot Runner & Flattener - A
Ballot Runner & Flattener - B
Ballot Sorter
Dropbox Ballot Receiver
1. Bundle all empty Absentee Envelopes in the order they were processed (voter number) with a rubber band and place them in the bin provided.

2. Initial the last voter number on the Voter Number Sheet.

3. Attempt to flatten the ballots:
   - Bend them at the scored folds
   - Roll them in different directions

4. Prepare your processed ballots and paperwork to have them counted:
   A. Put the Ballot Bag, Voter Log, Ward Sign, Voter Number Sheet, Write-in Form, and GAB-104 back into the Goldenrod Envelope
   B. Place the filled Goldenrod Envelope underneath the ballots

5. Take your ready to be counted work to the assigned counting station.
5. Record them as “ROB” (Reconstructed Official Ballot) on the GAB-104 with:
   - The voter’s number
   - Reason Code
   - Initials

City of Milwaukee Election Commission GAB-104

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Number</th>
<th>Description of Incident</th>
<th>Time Incident Occurred</th>
<th>Chief Inspector Initials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tally of Ballots Requiring Override</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overvote:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROB - Reconstructed Official Ballot Codes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D - Damaged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P - Pencil/Pen Marks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS - Overseas (Federal only ballot)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E - Emailed Reg Ballot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH - Other w/explanation (provide)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAB - Rejected Absentee Ballot Certificate Envelope Codes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWS - No Witness Signature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVS - No Voter Signature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T - Tampered/Taped</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWA - No Witness Address</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>OTH - Other w/explanation (provide)</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROB 1</td>
<td>#34 D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. On the original ballot:
   A. Select the reason for reconstruction
   B. Write the ROB#
   C. Write your initials and your partner’s initials

For Official Use Only

A. Inspectors: Identify ballots required to be remade:
   - Overvoted
   - Damaged
   - Other
   If this is the Original Ballot, write the serial number here: ROB1
   If this is the Duplicate Ballot, write the serial number here:

B. CWV ML
   Initials of inspectors who remade ballot

C. For Official Use Only

A. Inspectors: Identify ballots required to be remade:
   - Overvoted
   - Damaged
   - Other
   If this is the Original Ballot, write the serial number here:
   If this is the Duplicate Ballot, write the serial number here: ROB1

B. ML CWV
   Initials of inspectors who remade ballot
Envelopes are rejected for missing:
- Voter signature
- Witness signature
- Witness address

- Should already be marked for rejection in red marker ink or red rejection stamp at the beginning the batch of envelopes
  - Double check to make sure any have not been missed
    - If the Election Commission has not already marked an envelope to be rejected, please confirm with a Central Count Manager

- These ballots are not assigned a voter number

Record them as “RAB” (Rejected Absentee Ballots) on the GAB-104 with a reason code

---

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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAB 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Voter NWA</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWV/ML</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Write on the outside of the envelope “RAB1”
- RAB (Rejected Absentee Ballot)
- Number each sequentially RAB-1, RAB-2, etc.

Rejected Envelopes
- Place the “Rejected” unopened envelope containing the ballot in the Goldenrod Envelope
Partner 1
A. Announce the voter’s name
B. Number the envelope
C. Remove the ballot from the envelope
D. Number the ballot

Partner 2
A. Announce the voter number
B. Cross the number off the voter number sheet
C. Record the number on the Absentee Voter Log

Repeat until all envelopes are counted
Keep envelopes in voter number order

Create a separate pile for ExpressVote ballots or ballots that need reconstruction
1. Remove all record keeping paperwork for the Goldenrod Envelope

2. Confirm on the Chief Inspectors' Statement (GAB-104) that the serial number on the Ballot Bag matches the serial number on the GAB-104

3. Circle and initial that the serial numbers match on the GAB-104

NUMBER OF BALLOTS FOR THIS WARD:
BALLOT BAG CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY RECORD - CIRCLE AND INITIAL THE BALLOT BAG TIE SERIAL NUMBERS USED
FOR WARD #1 IS (58190) CHIEF INSPECTOR INITIALS: CWY

4. You and your partner will sign that you are working on this ward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signatures of Election Inspectors</th>
<th>Time Worked</th>
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<td>Justin Sargs</td>
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00192
Central Count Absentee Ballot Processing Procedures

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Important Information

- You will be working in pairs safely distanced from each other
- We are taking as many safety precautions as possible, everyone will be issued mask(s) and gloves
- Absentee ballot processing will begin at 7:00 AM when the manager announces: “The polls are now open”
- All absentee ballot envelopes prior to being processed on Election Day have already been scanned, sorted into ward order, and alphabetized by last name
- Each team will receive one Ward Packet at a time
Secondly, Celestine – do you like this idea? Where would you want the cameras on the laptops facing? At the DS200 machines or elsewhere?

Shelby Edlebeck
Multimedia Communication Specialist
City of Green Bay
920.448.3207
Hi Kris,

We are brainstorming how we would 'livestream' the central count taking place at City Hall on November 3rd. Do you have any ideas of what you are envisioning for this?

I was thinking of setting up laptops throughout the work zone with the cameras turned on (but mics muted) and streaming to a Zoom meeting. Then we could post the Zoom link on our website or email it out to whoever was interested in observing. Or whatever the protocol is for transparency during central count.

Let us know your thoughts or what you were thinking! ☺

Thank you,

Shelby Edlebeck

920.448.3207
Hi Amaad,

We have a new program we are working with that was created by associates of the grant team CTCL. We sent out over 600 emails (some of these are the regular poll workers, who have declined) but wanted to give them a chance to change their mind. Unfortunately, something is wrong with the program and they can't figure it out. Jaime had to send another email out today to make sure we covered all of our bases. So we are still getting people replying. Right now we have 280 poll workers confirmed with applications still coming in.

Kris Teske, WMC
Green Bay City Clerk
100 N. Jefferson St., Rm 106
Green Bay, WI 54301
920-448-3014

From: Amaad Rivera [mailto:Amaad.Rivera@greenbaywi.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2020 12:26 PM
To: Kris Teske <Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: Poll Workers

Kris,

I hope this email finds you well. There has been a ton of outreach to the city, as you know, on poll workers. We had a Tele-Town Hall two weeks ago, where over 200 folks indicated that they would apply to be a poll worker.

Could you give me a status update on the number of poll workers we currently have and the current need?

- Amaad

Amaad Rivera-Wagner
Community Liaison
Office of the Mayor
100 North Jefferson Street - Room 200
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54301
Phone: 920.448.3210
Deanna Debruler

From: Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein <michael@voteathome.org>
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2020 1:27 PM
To: Amaad Rivera; Jaime Fuge; Diana Ellenbecker; Kim Wayte; Celestine Jeffreys
Subject: Revised Central Count Roles
Attachments: Central Count Poll Worker Needs v2.xlsx

As discussed this morning:

65 people for shift 1 (6 AM - 3 PM)
65 people for shift 2 (2 PM - 11 PM)
25 people for shift 3 (10 PM - close)

I think the one big remaining question is just delivering the machines over to KI on Monday but I know, Diana, that you're working on it.

Michael

---

Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein
State Lead for Wisconsin (Leadership Now Fellow)
National Vote at Home Institute

he/him

Learn more about:
Election Officials Center
Mail Ballot FAQs
Mail Ballot Security
Hi Kris,

Can we help with curing absentee ballots that are missing a signature or witness signature/address?

We have a process map that we've worked out with Milwaukee for their process. We can also adapt the letter they're sending out with rejected absentee ballots along with a call script alerting voters (we can also get people to make the calls, too, so you don't need to worry about it). Celestine mentioned curing ballots might be something we could take off your plate.

When would be a good time to talk about it? I'm available this afternoon (after 2 PM), Friday (any time before 3) or next week. Any of those good for you?

Michael

--

Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein
State Lead for Wisconsin (Leadership Now Fellow)
National Vote at Home Institute
(310) 980-2872
he/him

Learn more about:
Election Officials Center
Mail Ballot FAQs
Mail Ballot Security

--

Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein
We could use laptops with some of the money along with printers for registration and for the greeters.

Kris Teske, WCMC
Green Bay City Clerk
100 N. Jefferson St., Rm 106
Green Bay, WI 54301
920-448-3014

Michael from National Vote at Home Institute
Feel free to connect with him. NVahi is one of the Technical Assistance Partners -- they published the Election Official Communications Toolkit. I did let him know about your RFP that hit the street this week.

Thanks, I'll reach out to him.

Badger Books
We encourage you to prioritize spending the grant funds on the programs, people, and technology related directly to the administration of your 2020 elections.

Point taken. What about purchasing express vote machines? The clerk hasn't mentioned that, I'm inquiring. We could use the express vote machines, if we can obtain them, right away.

Reallocating funds for voter outreach
Are you asking to move funds to the voter outreach bucket? If so, which bucket(s) are you pulling from?

- Increase Absentee Voting
- Launch Poll Worker Recruitment, Training, and Safety Efforts
- Ensure Safe and Efficient Election Day Administration
- To confirm: Is this your first time using Badger Books or are you ordering more Badger Books? This is the first time.
- Ryan and Dayna from Elections Group should be able to think through poll book implementation with you. Would you like me to get this conversation going with them or would you like to reach out directly to them? I’ll reach out to them about the badger books.

- Community groups:
  o I’m going to have our community relations aide reach out to community groups that will do voter outreach/education

- Amazing! How do I go about reallocating funds and how much would you suggest? I think we have about a $20k wiggle.

On Tue, Aug 25, 2020 at 10:55 AM Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:

Good morning, Whitney!

A few updates and a question.

First, did you connect the person below to us? I don’t recall meeting him, but that’s perhaps my oversight.

And some updates:

- Voter Outreach/Education:
  o The RFP for the public affairs firm is about to go on the street. It needs three weeks out there and then approval from committee and council. So that means we should have a firm engaged by mid-September, so probably 6 weeks of solid outreach/education. Does that square with what other municipalities are doing?

- Drop boxes:
  o We are going to talk about this internally on Thursday and make some decisions.
  o We’ll most likely forego the drop boxes at the polling locations and go for 4 drop boxes, potentially at the fire stations.
  o We have another conversation with the drop box team today.

- Poll books:
  o Kris obtained a quote for poll books and printers (called Badger books). I believe there are some implementation issues, especially around training. Any thoughts?

- Community groups:
  o I’m going to have our community relations aide reach out to community groups that will do voter outreach/education

That’s it, thanks!!
Badger Books
We encourage you to prioritize spending the grant funds on the programs, people, and technology related directly to the administration of your 2020 elections.

Point taken. What about purchasing express vote machines? The clerk hasn't mentioned that, I'm inquiring. We could use the express vote machines, if we can obtain them, right away.

Reallocation of funds for voter outreach
Are you asking to move funds to the voter outreach bucket? If so, which bucket(s) are you pulling from?

- Increase Absentee Voting
- Launch Poll Worker Recruitment, Training, and Safety Efforts
- Ensure Safe and Efficient Election Day Administration

Could we take funds from the Badger book line? That's $283K. If not, what about from the PPE/cough guards or the ballot folder lines?

There are probably 5 organizations in town that are focused on working with disadvantaged populations and/or with voters directly. I thought roughly $5K (each) for their efforts (reimbursable expenses, of course). I don't have a sense of what's appropriate, so I haven't thought of a budget. Whitney, what do you recommend?

Thanks!!
Celestine

Ensure Safe and Efficient Election Day Administration

Safe and Efficient Election Day Administration--$426,500
determine availability 10/15 Clerk
deadline and lead

purchase electronic poll books -- $283,500
RFP
determine need 9/8 Clerk (K)

purchase high speed tabulator—$62,000
RFP

purchase ballot opener and folder—$5,000
already purchased

additional staff to process absentee ballots on election day - $5,000
hire new staff, hire temps to replace staff?
how does existing staff reassign accomplish their own work?

determine need 9/8 Clerk (K)

PPE—$15,000
already purchased
I think I mentioned this before, but we have another person from Elections Group who is assisting Claire in Milwaukee. He moved there in September. So, all of this to say, having Dayna in Green Bay isn’t a new practice for the partners who are supporting the WI-5.

What do you think? Are y’all open to Dayna helping you in Green Bay?

We can also discuss it in our call tomorrow.

Thanks for your consideration,
Whitney

--

Whitney May
Director of Government Services
Center for Tech and Civic Life
whitney@techandciviclife.org
(919) 799-6173
she/her
Deanna Debruler

From: Diana Ellenbecker
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 3:57 PM
To: Kris Teske; Vanessa Chavez; Kim Wayte
Subject: RE: Dayna in Green Bay

Thank you,
Diana

From: Kris Teske
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 3:39 PM
To: Vanessa Chavez <Vanessa.Chavez@greenbaywi.gov>; Diana Ellenbecker <Diana.Ellenbecker@greenbaywi.gov>; Kim Wayte <Kim.Wayne@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: RE: Dayna in Green Bay

Kris Teske, WCMC
Green Bay City Clerk
100 N. Jefferson St., Rm 106
Green Bay, WI 54301
920-448-3014

From: Vanessa Chavez
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 3:37 PM
To: Kris Teske <Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov>; Diana Ellenbecker <Diana.Ellenbecker@greenbaywi.gov>; Kim Wayte <Kim.Wayne@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: RE: Dayna in Green Bay

Vanessa R. Chavez, City Attorney
City of Green Bay
(920) 449-3080
Vanessa.Chavez@greenbaywi.gov
Would you like to see the information I’ve already collected on geofencing and the cost of radio ads on the Spanish language radio? Attached is our mood board (we selected mood board 2). We’ve already sent out a document (attached) so I’d like to keep that look.

Here is my schedule for the rest of the week. Although I’m off on Friday, I would be available for a call Friday morning at 9:00 central.

Thanks!

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff, Mayor’s Office
City of Green Bay

The contents of this email are confidential, intended for the recipient only, and may be legally protected from disclosure. Please do not forward or disclose any information contained in this message without permission from the sender.
Then we can share it. but this needs to come from the city and not the PD

You are doing great....we are in this together!!

From: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 10:05 AM
To: Kala Lardinois <Kala.Lardinois@greenbaywi.gov>; Terri Racine <Terri.Racine@greenbaywi.gov>
Dawn Ouradnik <Dawn.Ouradnik@greenbaywi.gov>; Terry Sorelle <Terry.Sorelle@greenbaywi.gov>
Cc: Diana Ellenbecker <Diana.Ellenbecker@greenbaywi.gov>; Kevin Warych <Kevin.Warych@greenbaywi.gov>; Nina Robinette <Nina.Robinette@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: 2020-10-25 Voter Navigator FAQ--cmj

Hello!

Thank you for pitching in. I know this is a frantic time, and I deeply appreciate your patience and calm.

Please find attached some information that may help you answer questions about the Election. The most important thing is to be humble. If you don’t know the answer, take down their info and we can have someone call them back. At this point, the questions may be more complex, i.e., “I’ve been evicted and I’m temporarily living with my sister. Where do I vote?”

If you need something else, please let me know.

Appreciatively,

Celestine
Deanna Debruler

From: Saralynn Finn <saralynn@voteathome.org>
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 3:02 PM
To: Shelby Edlebeck
Cc: Sam Hutchison; Celestine Jeffreys; Kevin Warych; Kim Wayte; Diana Ellenbecker; Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein
Subject: Re: 2020-10-25 Voter Navigator FAQ--cmj

Well done!

On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 12:26 PM Shelby Edlebeck <Shelby.Edlebeck@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:

The FAQs have been added to the bottom of the Elections webpage: https://greenbaywi.gov/Elections

Or they can be found directly here: https://greenbaywi.gov/faq.aspx?TID=81

Thank you,

Shelby Edlebeck
920.448.3207

---

From: Saralynn Finn [mailto:saralynn@voteathome.org]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 1:53 PM
To: Sam Hutchison <sam@hvsproductions.com>
Cc: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>; Kevin Warych <Kevin.Warych@greenbaywi.gov>; Kim Wayte <Kim.Wayte@greenbaywi.gov>; Diana Ellenbecker <Diana.Ellenbecker@greenbaywi.gov>; Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein <michael@voteathome.org>; Shelby Edlebeck <Shelby.Edlebeck@greenbaywi.gov>
Subject: Re: 2020-10-25 Voter Navigator FAQ--cmj

Absolutely!

On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 11:52 AM Sam Hutchison <sam@hvsproductions.com> wrote:

Great idea.
From: Kris Teske [mailto:Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov]
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2020 9:19 AM
To: Sam Hutchison <sam@hvsproductions.com>
Cc: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>; Isabel Brinker <lBrinker@kw2madison.com>; Saralynn Finn <saralynn@voteathome.org>
Subject: RE: 2020-10-14 CGB Vote Countdown

Here are my corrections and additions.

Kris Teske, WCMC
Green Bay City Clerk
100 N. Jefferson St., Rm 106
Green Bay, WI 54301
920-448-3014

From: Sam Hutchison [mailto:sam@hvsproductions.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2020 3:19 PM
To: Kris Teske <Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov>
Cc: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>; Isabel Brinker <lBrinker@kw2madison.com>; Saralynn Finn <saralynn@voteathome.org>
Subject: FW: 2020-10-14 CGB Vote Countdown

Hi Kris,

We’ve prepared some daily Election Countdown copy to be used for social media posts and talking points. Celestine has made some revisions and corrections, and asked me to send it to you as well for review. Let me know if you notice anything that is incorrect or you would like changed or worded differently.

Thank you,

Sam Hutchison
sam@hvsproductions.com
HVS Advertising-Marketing | A Division of Image Keepers, Inc.
2021 S. Webster Ave. Green Bay, WI 54301-2257
920.430.5131 ext. 224

From: Celestine Jeffreys [mailto:Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2020 2:55 PM
To: Sam Hutchison <sam@hvsproductions.com>
Subject: RE: 2020-10-14 CGB Vote Countdown

That would be good, thanks!

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff, Mayor’s Office
City of Green Bay
Thanks, Whitney!

Celeste, so nice to “meet” you! I would love to connect anytime. Unfortunately, I’m on a plane most of tomorrow, but I’m very flexible on Friday (except 2:45 – 4:15 ET). Just let me know if there’s a good time for you on Friday or if you would like me to go ahead and send some options for next week.

Thank you both for everything you’re doing!

Liz

---

From: Whitney May <whitney@techandciviclife.org>
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 7:42 PM
To: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>
Cc: Liz Howard <howardl@brennan.law.nyu.edu>
Subject: Green Bay, WI + Brennan Center: Election integrity efforts

Hi Celestine,

I'm connecting you with Liz Howard at the Brennan Center. They focus on election integrity in lots of shapes and forms, including post-election audits and cybersecurity just to name a couple. Liz is amazing and I think she will be a good person to bounce ideas off of when it comes to the election security and integrity questions you have in Green Bay.

Hey Liz,

Celestine is the Green Bay Mayor’s Chief of Staff. She is taking on a lot of the responsibilities with implementing the Green Bay Safe Voting Plan. Right now she is talking with her local leaders and advocates about balancing the transparency and safety of the election process. She's in conversation with her police lieutenant about some options that he and the department can provide.

I hope y'all can find time to connect soon and share ideas. And I'll let you take it from here!

Stay healthy and safe out there,
Whitney

--

Whitney May
Director of Government Services
Center for Tech and Civic Life
whitney@techandciviclife.org
(919) 799-6173
she/her
Deanna Debruler

From: Celestine Jeffreys
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2020 5:53 AM
To: Whitney May
Cc: Liz Howard
Subject: RE: Green Bay, WI + Brennan Center: Election integrity efforts

Thank you, Whitney for connecting us!

Dear Liz,

A pleasure to meet you over email!

On Monday the 28th, Clerk Teske, the Police Chief and two commanders, Commander Warych and Commander Ebel, will meet to discuss election security. Commander Paul Ebel collects and responds to Department of Homeland Security bulletins. He also arranges security for visiting dignitaries. I’m going to connect the two of you, because you speak the same language and can easily discuss and prepare security needs for Election Day.

Thank you!

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff, Mayor’s Office
City of Green Bay

From: Whitney May <whitney@techandciviclife.org>
Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 6:42 PM
To: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>
Cc: Liz Howard <howardl@brennan.law.nyu.edu>
Subject: Green Bay, WI + Brennan Center: Election integrity efforts

Hi Celestine,

I’m connecting you with Liz Howard at the Brennan Center. They focus on election integrity in lots of shapes and forms, including post-election audits and cybersecurity just to name a couple. Liz is amazing and I think she will be a good person to bounce ideas off of when it comes to the election security and integrity questions you have in Green Bay.

Hey Liz,

Celestine is the Green Bay Mayor’s Chief of Staff. She is taking on a lot of the responsibilities with implementing the Green Bay Safe Voting Plan. Right now she is talking with her local leaders and advocates about balancing the transparency and safety of the election process. She’s in conversation with her police lieutenant about some options that he and the department can provide.

I hope y’all can find time to connect soon and share ideas. And I’ll let you take it from here!

Stay healthy and safe out there,
Whitney
Deanna Debruler

From: Celestine Jeffreys
Sent: Monday, August 17, 2020 5:36 PM
To: Whitney May
Subject: RE: Cities Project: Green Bay, WI advertising plan for November

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Completed

Awesome, Whitney, thanks!!

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff, Mayor's Office
City of Green Bay

From: Whitney May [mailto:whitney@techandciviclife.org]
Sent: Monday, August 17, 2020 5:33 PM
To: Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>
Cc: eric@modernelections.org
Subject: Cities Project: Green Bay, WI advertising plan for November

Hi Celestine,

During our last check in call you expressed the need for a communications consultant to review your advertising plan for November.

Eric Ming, cc'd, is the Communications Director for CSME, one of the technical assistance partners for the grant. He's from Wisconsin and he's a big Packers fan.

Hi Eric,

Celestine Jeffreys is Chief of Staff for the Mayor and she's the Green Bay lead for the implementation of their safe voting plan.

Here's what I've heard from Celestine so far:

- They'd like to do radio ads on local Spanish-language radio stations, as well as geofencing.
- They have a slogan, “Mailed it” and a mood board.
- This is an urgent need.

I'm sure she has more to add to the conversation, so I'll let y'all take it from here.

Thanks again for your work on this,
Whitney M

--
Whitney May
Director of Government Services
Center for Tech and Civic Life
With November in mind, I’m cc’ing the designers from Center for Civic Design, Asher & Christopher. CCD is one of the amazing technical assistance partners available to support the WI-5 (we really do need to get WI-5 tshirts).

Since we’ve heard interest from you about what other cities are doing, we thought it would be helpful to gather feedback on absentee envelopes and instructions from the WI-5 cohort as a group rather than gathering feedback separately.

- Here are the absentee instructions designed by CCD
  - It’s a template in a Word doc
  - You can edit and customize for your city
  - Christopher and Asher are available to consult on design
  - Christopher and Asher have designed this by combining CCD’s best practices and language from Madison’s instructions.

- Here are the absentee envelopes designed by CCD
  - CCD has been working on the design with WEC
  - CCD + Oxide Design are available to consult on design and printing with your printer
  - Consult can look like adjusting the templates, adding your contact and other information, working with your envelope vendors (if needed) as you fit the layouts into your process (including any size or placement adjustments), or just providing any support, advice, or reviews of proofs.

Do you and your teams have capacity to review these materials and provide questions and feedback to CTCL & CCD before the end of the week?

We know you are all working on tight timelines for printing and collating absentee materials. Please let CTCL & CCD know how we can be most helpful moving forward. If it’s useful, grant funds are available for cities that want to print new envelopes.

Thank you,
Whitney & Josh from CTCL
That’s too bad about the envelope. Those changes are really good!

Celestine Jeffreys
Chief of Staff
Office of the Mayor
920.448.3006

From: Whitney May <whitney@techandciviclife.org>
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2020 7:38 PM
To: Witzel-Behl, Maribeth <MWitzel-Behl@cityofmadison.com>
Cc: Michelle Nelson <mnelson@kenosha.org>; Coolidge, Tara <tara.coolidge@cityofracine.org>; Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov>; cwooda@milwaukee.gov; Kris Teske <Kris.Teske@greenbaywi.gov>; Josh Goldman <josh@techandciviclife.org>; Asher Kolieboi <asher@civicdesign.org>; Christopher Patten <christopher@civicdesign.org>
Subject: UPDATE: Absentee instructions template & envelopes from Center for Civic Design: No action required

Hello everyone,

Thank you for taking time to review the CCD materials and ask questions today.

CTCL is putting the brakes on operation envelope with the WI-5 because:

- WEC wants everyone in the state using the same formats
- WEC wants to complete new envelope design work next year
- WEC shared uniform instructions today

Apologies for any confusion. Please reach out with any questions or concerns. And keep truckin'.
Hi all, here's the log I put together for moving ballots in the morning and evening.

It's meant to be printed double-sided so each truck will have its own sheet. We'll need to print 4 total, 2 for the morning, 2 for the evening.

Michael

On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 4:57 PM Celestine Jeffreys <Celestine.Jeffreys@greenbaywi.gov> wrote:

Celestine Jeffreys is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Join Zoom Meeting

Meeting ID:
Passcode:
One tap mobile
+19292056099,,82422490111#,,,,0#,763276# US (New York)
+13017158592,,82422490111#,,,,0#,763276# US (Germantown)

Dial by your location
+1 929 205 6099 US (New York)
+1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown)
+1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago)
+1 669 900 6833 US (San Jose)
+1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma)
+1 346 248 7799 US (Houston)

Meeting ID:
Passcode:
Find your local number: https://us02web.zoom.us/w/kmiPjfv6

--

Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein
State Lead for Wisconsin (Leadership Now Fellow)
National Vote at Home Institute
What Are Observers NOT Allowed To Do?

Observers must comply with the rules of the Chief Election Inspector or they will be removed.

- DO NOT interfere in any way with the election process.
- DO NOT assist in Central Count operations.
- DO NOT touch election-related material, equipment or election staff.
- DO NOT sit at or stand behind the check-in tables.
- DO NOT communicate with Central Count personnel while they are engaged in a process.
- DO NOT converse with or solicit voters within 100 feet of the Central Count entrance to influence voting or question their qualifications to vote.
- DO NOT speak in a loud voice, cause confusion, or congregate inside a Central Count.
- DO NOT display any election material or wear campaign badges, buttons, or apparel.
- DO NOT wear the uniform of a law enforcement officer, private guard, or security personnel.
- DO NOT use video or cameras in a disruptive way or show how an elector has voted.

Public Observation and Covid-19

In order to protect the health and safety of our community, we may need to limit the number of observers allowed at polling places and Central Count. The Election Inspector of each location has determined how many observers are allowed at their location, based on space constraints and public health guidelines. Please be mindful of others who wish to observe and limit your observation if there are others waiting to observe.

All poll observers must follow COVID-19 precautions as recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including:

- Stay home if you have experienced any symptoms in the last 14 days, including but not limited to fever, chills, nausea, difficulty breathing, cough or fatigue.
- Wear a face covering that covers your nose, mouth, and chin at all times.
- Stay at least 6 feet distance away from others at all times.

Any observers not following these guidelines will be asked to comply or be removed from the observation area.

Remote Observation

To increase access to poll observation with and reduced the risk of transmission, we have set up remote observation of Central Count. A link to the livestream can be found on our website on Election Day. Challenges will only be accepted in person at Central Count. All rules for in-person poll observation remain in place for remote observation, including:

- DO NOT record voter or ballot data.
- DO NOT interfere with the conduct of the election.
- DO NOT use force, violence, or intimidation to compel a person to vote or refrain from voting.

The National Vote at Home Institute is an IRS-approved section 501(c)(3) public charity. Your donation will be tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law.
Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan 2020
Submitted to the Center for Tech & Civic Life
June 15, 2020

The State of Wisconsin found itself in the midst of an historic election in April of 2020 when statewide elections occurred in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. These elections included not only the presidential preference vote, but also local races for city councils, county boards, school board, and mayors, a statewide election for a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and numerous district-wide school referenda.

Municipalities were required to make rapid and frequent adjustments to ensure compliance with the rapidly changing Supreme Court, Wisconsin Supreme Court, and Wisconsin Election Commission (WEC) rulings about the election. (The April 2020 Election may go down in history as the only election in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court weighed in on the same day on how the election would be conducted.)

The shifting legal landscape was also complicated by the extraordinary lengths municipal clerks went to to ensure that both voting and election administration were done in accordance with prevailing public health requirements.

As mayors in Wisconsin’s five biggest cities - Milwaukee, Madison, Green Bay, Kenosha, and Racine - we seek to work collaboratively on the two remaining 2020 elections (August 11th and November 3rd) to: safely administer elections to reduce the risk of exposure to coronavirus for our residents as well as our election officials and poll workers; identify best practices; innovate to efficiently and effectively educate our residents about how to exercise their right to vote; be intentional and strategic in reaching our historically disenfranchised residents and communities; and, above all, ensure the right to vote in our dense and diverse communities.
See Table 2, below, for detailed data on all five municipalities' April 2020 absentee mail and in-person early voting experiences.

**Table 2: Summary of Municipalities’ Experiences in April 2020 Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Green Bay</th>
<th>Kenosha</th>
<th>Madison</th>
<th>Milwaukee</th>
<th>Racine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of voters who requested absentee ballots for April election</td>
<td>15,509</td>
<td>16,017</td>
<td>89,730</td>
<td>96,712</td>
<td>11,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of absentee ballots successfully cast in April</td>
<td>11,928</td>
<td>13,144</td>
<td>77,677</td>
<td>76,362</td>
<td>9,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of absentee ballot requests unfulfilled due to insufficient photo ID</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1,840</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>Estimated hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of absentee ballots rejected due to incomplete certification</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>1,671</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of secure drop-boxes for absentee ballot return</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of days of early voting</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use curbside voting for early voting?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of voters who voted in-person early absentee</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4,930</td>
<td>11,612</td>
<td>1,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of additional staff enlisted for election-related efforts</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ spent on PPE</td>
<td>$2,122</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$6,305</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of polling locations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use drive-thru or curbside voting on Election Day?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Green Bay</td>
<td>Kenosha</td>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>Racine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage and Increase Absentee Voting By Mail and Early, In-Person</td>
<td>$277,000</td>
<td>$455,239</td>
<td>$548,500</td>
<td>$998,500</td>
<td>$293,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dramatically Expand Strategic Voter Education &amp; Outreach Efforts</td>
<td>$215,000</td>
<td>$58,000</td>
<td>$175,000</td>
<td>$280,000</td>
<td>$337,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch Poll Worker Recruitment, Training &amp; Safety Efforts</td>
<td>$174,900</td>
<td>$145,840</td>
<td>$507,788</td>
<td>$800,000</td>
<td>$181,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure Safe &amp; Efficient Election Day Administration</td>
<td>$426,500</td>
<td>$203,700</td>
<td>$40,500</td>
<td>$76,000</td>
<td>$130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>$1,093,400</td>
<td>$862,779</td>
<td>$1,271,788</td>
<td>$2,154,500</td>
<td>$594,2100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
election, very small numbers of voters had traditionally chosen to cast ballots by mail. Municipal clerks' offices simply were not prepared and do not have the staffing or technological resources needed to quickly process dramatically higher numbers of absentee ballot requests, troubleshoot problems, answer voter questions, provide information and to expedite the processing of thousands of received absentee ballots on Election Day.

In-person early absentee voting also poses challenges for voters and election administrators. While all of our communities had previously offered early voting locations and hours, April's election required election officials to creatively and quickly expand in-person early voting opportunities, including curbside voting, all while prioritizing necessary COVID-19 precautions.

As indicated by Table 4, below, all five of our municipalities are already experiencing dramatic increases in the number of voters requesting to vote absentee, compared to pre-pandemic, and must procure resources to enable voters in our communities to meaningfully access absentee voting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Absentee Ballots in All Municipalities as of June 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>City</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong># of voters on permanent absentee list prior to 2/18/20</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong># of voters on permanent absentee list as of 4/7/20</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong># of voters who have already requested absentee ballots for August 2020</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong># of voters who have already requested absentee ballots for November 2020</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We are committed to making voting accessible via mail, in-person prior to Election Day, and at the polls on Election Day. Particularly in the midst of a global pandemic when many voters are rightfully apprehensive about in-person voting, we want to ensure that voters in our communities know they have options and we are committed to conducting the necessary voter outreach and education to promote absentee voting and encourage higher percentages of our electors to vote absentee.
1. Provide assistance to help voters comply with absentee ballot requests & certification requirements

- **Green Bay:** The City would like to employ bilingual LTE "voter navigators" ($46,000) to help residents properly upload valid photo ID, complete their ballots and comply with certification requirements, and offer witness signatures. These voter navigators can assist voters prior to the elections and then also be trained and utilized as election inspectors. They would also like to utilize paid social media and local print and radio advertising to educate and direct voters in how to upload photo ID and how to request and complete absentee ballots. ($2,000) **Total:** $47,000

- **Kenosha:** The City would like to have Clerk's staff train library staff on how to help residents request and complete absentee ballots, would like to produce ($3,000) and mail ($26,200) a bilingual absentee ballot instruction sheet with all absentee ballots to increase correctly completed and submitted ballots. The City would like to hire a trainer for seasonal election workers, volunteers and poll workers. This employee would also coordinate assignments to polling locations, the early driver up voting site, the Clerk's office for assistance in processing, data entry and filing of absentee requests and the Absentee Board of Canvassers (approximately $50,000). The increase in absentee ballots due to COVID-19 has tremendously increased the workload of the department. In order to properly serve the citizens and voters additional LTE employees are needed (approximately $175,000). **Total:** $254,200

- **Madison:** Plans to hold curbside "Get your ID on File" events with the Clerk this summer utilizing volunteers or paid poll workers ($15,000) equipped with PPE (estimated $5,000) and digital cameras ($4,500) to capture voter ID images for voters who are unable to electronically submit their IDs to the Clerk's office. They also need large flags to draw attention to these curbside sites ($4,000). Would also like mobile wifi hotspots and tablets for all of these sites ($100,000) so voters could complete their voter registration and absentee requests all at once, without having to wait for staff in the Clerk's office to follow up on paper forms. (These mobile wifi hotspots, tablets, and flags, could all then be repurposed for early in-person voting closer to the election.) **Total:** $128,500

- **Milwaukee:** The City notes that the biggest obstacle to Milwaukee residents, particularly those in poverty, to applying for an absentee ballot in April was access to the internet and securing an image of their photo ID. To address this, the City will be promoting and utilizing Milwaukee Public Library branch staff ($90,000 for both elections) for 3 weeks prior to each election to assist any potential absentee voters with applying, securing, and uploading images of their valid photo ID. **Total:** $90,000

- **Racine:** The City will recruit and promote ($1,000), train ($3,000), and employ paid Voter Ambassadors ($8,000) who will be provided with both PPE and
• **Racine:** The City currently has one secured drop box for absentee ballots, and would like to have 3 additional drop boxes, each equipped with security cameras, to install at key locations around the City. **Total:** $18,000.

**Total:** $216,500

3. **Deploy Additional Staff and/or Technology Improvements to Expedite & Improve Accuracy of Absentee Ballot Processing**

The process of assembling and mailing absentee ballots is labor-intensive, slow, and subject to human error. Absentee ballot requests must be approved and entered into the statewide system, labels must be printed and applied to envelopes, ballots must be initialed, folded, and inserted into the envelope along with instructions. Ballots must be logged when received back from the voter. Undeliverable ballots must be reviewed, reissued or canceled. When voters make mistakes on ballots the requests to reissue must be completed. These tasks are time-consuming and utilizing existing clerk’s office staff pulls them away from all of the other service requests, phone answering, and tasks handled by busy municipal clerks’ offices.

The tremendous increase in absentee ballot requests in April was unprecedented, and municipal clerks and their staff were unprepared for the volume. They responded remarkably well - particularly since many of their staff were, by late March and early April, working remotely or, at a minimum, all needing to adhere to social distancing and masking precautions when working together in the same room - but all five municipalities need additional resources to accurately and swiftly process absentee ballot requests.

• **Green Bay:** The City needs 45 additional staff to process absentee ballot requests before the election, to open and verify envelopes on Election Day, and insert them into the tabulators. After the election, staff are needed to enter new voter registrations and assist with all election certification tasks ($140,000 for staffing) The City would also like to purchase a ballot opener and ballot folder to expedite processing ($5,000). **Total:** $145,000.

• **Kenosha:** The City needs resources for absentee ballot processing, to staff and process early, in-person absentee requests, and to answer voters’ questions (approximately $100,000). Additional workers are also needed to canvass absentee ballots (approximately $11,000) **Total:** $111,000

• **Madison:** Based on data from April, the City estimates it will need additional staffing ($110,000) for hourly election clerks for the fall elections, and will incur
labor-intensive. Additionally, particularly in the larger cities among us, it requires law enforcement and traffic control assistance to help manage traffic.

- **Green Bay**: The City would like to expand and establish at least three EVPAV sites in trusted locations, ideally on the east (potentially UWGB) and west sides (potentially NWTC or an Oneida Nation facility) of the City, as well as at City Hall. The City is planning to offer early voting starting two weeks before each election, with several weekdays available until 6:30pm and Saturdays 10am-4pm. They would like to staff these early voting sites with election inspectors who are bilingual and would like to increase the salary rate for these bilingual election inspectors to assist with recruitment and retention, as well as in recognition of their important role at these sites. The City also will need to print additional ballots, signage, and materials to have available at these early voting sites. **Total: $35,000.**

- **Kenosha**: The City plans to have one early voting location, at City Hall, and plans to hold early voting two weeks before the August election, with no weekend or evening hours planned, and 4 weeks before the November election, with access until 7pm two days/week and Saturday voting availability the week before the election. If City Hall is still closed to the public, they will explore offering early drive thru voting on City Hall property. Resources are needed for staffing (approximately $40,000), PPE ($1,050), signage ($200), laptops, printers, and purchase of a large tent ($8,789) to utilize for drive thru early voting. Staff could see voters’ ID, print their label, hand them their ballot, and then collect the completed envelope. This would also allow staff to help voters properly do certification and provide witness signatures if necessary. The City could do this for one full week before elections. **Total $50,039.**

- **Madison**: The City would like to provide 18 in-person absentee voting locations for the two weeks leading up to the August election, and for the four weeks leading up to the November election. Their original plan was to offer in-person absentee voting at all nine library locations, the City Clerk’s Office, a city garage, Edgewood College, two Madison College locations, and four UW-Madison locations. Due to weather uncertainties, they will need to purchase and utilize tents ($100,000) for the curbside voting locations in order to protect the ballots, staff, and equipment from getting wet and will also need large feather flags to identify the curbside voting sites. (Additional staff costs covered by the earlier question re. Absentee ballot processing.) The City would also like to get carts ($60,000) for our ExpressVote accessible ballot marking devices so we can use the ExpressVote for curbside voting to normalize the use of ExpressVote to help voters with disabilities feel less segregated during the voting process. **Total: $160,000.**

- **Milwaukee**: The City would like to set up 3 in-person early voting locations for two weeks prior to the August election ($150,000) and 15 in-person early voting
Recommendation II: Dramatically Expand Voter & Community Education & Outreach, Particularly to Historically Disenfranchised Residents

All five municipalities expressed strong and clear needs for resources to conduct voter outreach and education to their communities, with a particular emphasis on reaching voters of color, low-income voters without reliable access to internet, voters with disabilities, and voters whose primary language is not English. This outreach is particularly necessary given the voter confusion that ensued in the lead-up to the April election, and voters' concerns and questions about voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. We understand that our communities of color do not necessarily trust the voting process, and that we need to work to earn that trust. We want to be transparent and open about what happens behind the scenes in elections, and what options are available for casting a ballot. We also want to make sure we are listening to groups that have historically been disenfranchised and groups that are facing obstacles with voting during this pandemic, and working with them to effectively respond to their concerns.

Voter outreach and education is also needed to encourage and explain new voter registration, and to encourage voters to verify and update their address or other voter registration information to do so prior to the Election. None of our communities have sufficient resources budgeted or available for the strategic, intentional, and creative outreach and education efforts that are needed in our communities over the summer and into the fall.

We all want our communities to have certainty about how the voting process works, trust in our election administration's accuracy, and current, accurate information on what options are available to vote safely in the midst of the pandemic. Significant resources are needed for all five municipalities to engage in robust and intentional voter education efforts to reduce confusion; encourage and facilitate new voter registration and registration updates; provide clear, accessible, and accurate information; address voters' understandable pandemic-related safety concerns; reassure voters of the security of our election administration; and, ultimately, reduce ballot errors and lost votes and enhance our residents' trust and confidence in our electoral process.

- **Green Bay**: Would like to reach voters and potential voters through a multi-prong strategy utilizing "every door direct mail," targeted mail, geo-fencing, billboards, radio, television, and streaming-service PSAs, digital advertising, and automated calls and texts ($100,000 total). The City would also like to ensure that these efforts can be done in English, Spanish, Hmong, and Somali, since roughly 11% of households in the Green Bay area speak a language other than English. Ideally, the City would employ limited term communications staff or engage communications consultants ($50,000) from August through the November election to design these communications and design and launch paid advertising on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, also in multiple languages. The City would also like to directly mail to residents who are believed to be eligible but not registered voters, approximately 20,000 residents. It would require both
($250,000). This communications effort would include numerous voter education ads and PSAs on radio, billboards, buses, with some using local celebrities like Milwaukee Bucks players. This communications effort would focus on appealing to a variety of communities within Milwaukee, including historically underrepresented communities such as LatinX and African Americans, and would include a specific focus on the re-enfranchisement of voters who are no longer on probation or parole for a felony. Additionally, this campaign would include an edgy but nonpartisan and tasteful communications campaign to harness the current protests’ emphasis on inequity and ties that message to voting. The video, the ads, and the PSAs could all also be placed on social media, the Election Commission and City websites, and GOTV partner websites and social media. **Total: $280,000**

- **Racine:** The City would like to retain a communications firm to design and implement a comprehensive voter outreach communications plan ($80,000). This would include ads on Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat. The City would also like to rent billboards in key parts of the City ($5,000) to place messages in Spanish to reach Spanish-speaking voters. The City would also like to do targeted outreach aimed at City residents with criminal records to encourage them to see if they are not eligible to vote; this outreach will be accomplished with the production, editing, and sharing of a YouTube video ($2,000) specifically on this topic shared on the City’s website, social media channels, and through community partners. Racine would also like to purchase a Mobile Voting Precinct so the City can travel around the City to community centers and strategically chosen partner locations and enable people to vote in this accessible (ADA-compliant), secure, and completely portable polling booth on wheels, an investment that the City will be able to use for years to come. (Estimated cost $250,000). **Total: $337,000**

Recommendaion II Total For All Strategies to Dramatically Expand Strategic Voter Education and Outreach Efforts, Particularly to Historically Disenfranchised Residents: $1,065,000.00
($369,788). The City has also found it challenging to convince facilities to host a polling location in the midst of a pandemic, and would like to provide each facility with a small amount of funds to compensate for their increased cleaning and sanitization costs ($750/location, $138,000 total). Total: $507,788

- Milwaukee: The City plans to have 45 voting locations in August and to keep open as many of the normal 180 polling places as possible in November. August will require 3 chief inspectors per site and 20 election workers per site, for a total of 1200 election workers minimum and 150 chief inspectors. The City has a goal of recruiting 1,000 new election workers. The City would like to add an additional $100 per worker in hazard pay to the poll workers’ stipends of $130 ($460,000 additional for both elections) and $100 hazard pay to chief inspector stipends of $225 ($87,750 additional for both elections). Additionally, the City of Milwaukee utilizes a Central Count of absentee ballots, which necessitates 15 chiefs and 200 election workers per election at Central Count ($50,000/day for 2- days each election for a total of $200,000). Total payroll for both elections will reach $750,000 based upon these calculations. The City will launch a recruitment campaign for a new generation of election workers to sign up and be involved in their democracy, and hopes this effort can be included in the above request for resources for a marketing firm. Recruiting new and younger poll workers means that the Election Commission will need to innovate in election training. The Commission would like to produce polling place training videos ($50,000) with live small-group, socially distanced discussions and Q&A sessions. These videos will augment existing training manuals. Total: $800,000

- Racine: The City needs approximately 150 poll workers for August and 300 for November, in addition to 36 Chief Inspectors, and would like to pay all workers a $100/election hazard pay ($118,000 total payroll for both elections). City notes that its desire to have more early voting locations and hours is directly impacted by its ability to hire and train election officials. To that end, the City would like to launch a recruitment campaign that includes radio ads ($1,000), ads on social media platforms ($10,000), billboards in strategic City locations ($5,000), and film videos for high school students in history/government classes ($500). The City would also like to enlist a communication firm to: create a training video for election officials, develop an online quiz, detailed packets for election officials, and a PPE video filmed by a health professional about necessary COVID-19 precautions during all voting operations ($22,000 total). Racine would also like to hire a liaison position to schedule, training and facilitate poll workers. ($35,000) Total: $181,500.

Recommendation III Total for All Strategies to Launch Poll Worker Recruitment, Training and Safety Efforts: $1,810,028.00
- **Milwaukee:** The City will be purchasing 400 plexiglass barriers ($55,000) for election workers at all polling location receiving and registration tables. Additionally, the Milwaukee Election Commission will need to acquire 400 face shields for workers not staffed behind plexiglass ($4,000), gloves for all poll workers ($3,000), masks on hand for election workers and members of the public ($5,000), hand sanitizer ($2,000) and disinfectant ($2,000). Additionally, since Milwaukee also plans to offer curbside voting as an option at all polling places, updated, larger, more visible signage is necessary ($5,000). **Total: $76,000**

- **Racine:** Racine plans to issue all 36 wards its own PPE supply box which will each include masks, cleaning supplies, pens for each voter, gloves, hand sanitizer, safety vests, goggles, etc. ($16,000). The City also needs large signs to direct and inform voters printed in English and Spanish ($3,000). Additionally, the City would like to deploy a team of paid trained EDR Specialists for each polling location ($10,000, including hourly pay, training expenses, and office supplies). As well, Racine would like iPads with cellular signal for each polling location to be able to easily verify voters' registration status and ward ($16,000). The City would like to equip all wards with Badger Books ($85,000); Racine began using electronic poll books in the February 2020 election and has found they dramatically increase and facilitate EDR, verification of voters’ photo ID, expedite election processes, and reduce human error. **Total: $130,000**

**Recommendation IV Total for All Strategies to Ensure Safe & Efficient Election Day Administration: $876,700.00**

**Conclusion**

As Mayors in Wisconsin’s five largest cities, we are committed to working collaboratively and innovatively to ensure that all of our residents can safely exercise their right to vote in 2020’s remaining elections in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. The April 2020 election placed two of our most sacred duties in conflict: keeping our residents safe and administering free, fair, and inclusive elections. This Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan 2020 represents a remarkable and creative comprehensive plan, submitted collaboratively by all five of our cities. With sufficient resources, all five municipalities will swiftly, efficiently, and effectively implement the recommended strategies described in this plan, to ensure safe, fair, inclusive, secure, and professional elections in all of our communities this year.
March 10, 2021

Wisconsin Campaign and Elections Committee

I am the former, Brown County Clerk, of which the City of Green Bay is a jurisdiction. I served as County Clerk for 8 years and Deputy County Clerk for 14 years. Hence, I have 22 years’ experience managing and conducting elections.

The reason I am here today is to describe what state statutes and election administration duties are charged to the county clerk, municipal clerks, and deputy clerks.

WI ss. 7.15(1) Supervise registration and elections. Each municipal clerk shall perform the following duties and any others which many to necessary to properly conduct elections or registration.

These duties and responsibilities include equipping polling places, maintenance and purchase of election equipment, prepare ballots and distribution, manage absentee ballot requests and delivery, prepare and post public notices, hire and train election officials, discharge election officials for improper conduct or willful neglect of duties; report fraud, irregularities, violations to the proper authorities, assign election inspectors to polling places, understand election laws and election administration rules, obtain required WEC election training and certification, and various other managerial functions and obligations.

Election security is of the utmost importance and clearly federal and state governments have worked the past 4 years to emphasize its significance by sending over $400 million dollars to local governments to ensure the safety and legitimacy of elections in 2020. Clerks are charged with securing: the Internet, electronic tabulation equipment, ballot and materials storage, and access to polling locations. Security is the single most important function because any potential breach can have a negative and direct effect on elections credibility and integrity.

The clerk, the jurisdiction’s election official, is responsible and accountable for all facets of elections and performs these duties under oath of office. In the case of the City of Green Bay for the November 3, 2020 election, Kris Teske was the appointed city clerk, and served in this position for over 8 years.

I worked with Kris Teske throughout her tenure as city clerk and elections specialist. Kris conducted numerous elections efficiently, effectively and with accuracy. Kris was the chief election official in Wisconsin’s third largest municipality. She is very fluent on election laws and is very particular in seeking guidance to questions, concerns, and related matters. Together, we accomplished many improvements in election processes, procedures, and purchasing election equipment. Her experience in managing elections in an ever-changing environment of election law, status of numerous lawsuits, and COVID concerns is commended.

In March of 2020, communication with the City Clerk’s Office came to a halt. Under COVID, Mayor Eric Genrich, put city hall on lock down. Emails and phone calls to city offices were not answered. Access to city hall was prohibited. Suddenly, Brown County’s largest municipality had no direct communication with the County Clerk’s Office. I believe at this point the city clerk’s election powers became compromised; and elections were taken over by the Mayor of Green Bay, Eric Genrich, and his chief of staff Celestine Jeffreys. Listed below are some news articles that support this claim.

1. March 20, 2020, Mayor Genrich along with several other mayors held a press conference expressing “concerns for safety of the public and their employees if an in-person election is held on April 7”. This press conference followed the Democratic Party National Committee, and the Democratic Party of Wisconsin filed a suit in federal court to extend deadlines and suspend voter ID requirements due to the spread of the Virus.9
2. March 25, 2020 “the city of Green Bay and its clerk have filed a federal lawsuit against the Wisconsin Elections Commission and Evers administration seeking to delay the states April 7 election and transition it to an election conducted by mail”.8
3. April 5, 2020 “The mayors, who say they represent 1.3 million constituents in total, include Tom Barrett of Milwaukee, Erich Genrich of Green Bay, Lori Palmieri of Oshkosh, Tim Kabat of La Crosse, John Antaramian of Kenosha, Cory Mason of Racine, Tim Hanna of Appleton, Satya Rhodes-Conway of Madison, Karen Mischel of Viroqua and Kathy